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An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence
Richard A. Posner*
The law of evidence is the body of rules that determines what,
and how, information may be provided to a legal tribunal that must
resolve a factual dispute. The importance of the accurate resolution
of such disputes to an economically efficient system of law has been
discussed at length,1 but the economic literature dealing with the
rules themselves is scanty in relation to the scope and importance of
evidence law.2 This article is the first comprehensive (though it is
*

Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. I thank Elizabeth Beetz, Susan Burgess,
Brian Butler, Dimitri Karcazes, Anup Malani, Kenneth Murphy, and Andrew
Swartz for excellent research assistance; Ronald Allen, Gary Becker, Andrew
Daughety, Gertrud Fremling, Bruce Kobayashi, Richard Lempert, Erzo
Luttmer, Eric Posner, Jennifer Reinganum, Michael Saks, Steven Shavell,
Stephen Stigler, Cass Sunstein, and participants in the University of
Chicago’s Seminar on Rational Models in the Social Sciences for many very
helpful comments on a previous draft; and Tomas Philipson and Sherwin
Rosen for enlightening conversations on the subject matter of the paper.
1 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration,” 2 Journal of Legal Studies 399 (1973);
Louis Kaplow, “Accuracy in Adjudication,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, vol. 1, p. 1 (Peter Newman ed. 1998); Kaplow, “The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,” 23 Journal of Legal Studies 307 (1994).
2 I shall be citing much if it in this article. For other contributions, see
Michael Block et al., “Fact-Finding Efficiency in Legal Procedure: An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Regimes”
(University of Arizona, College of Business and Public Administration, Dept.
of Economics, Discussion Paper 98–1, June 1998); Stephen McG. Bundy and
Einer Richard Elhauge, “Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A
General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation,” 79 California Law
Review 313 (1991); Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, “On the
Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence and Equilibrium Bias”
(Vanderbilt University, Dept. of Economics and Business Administration,
Working Paper No. 98–W02, April 1998); Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E.
Spier, “Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective,” 26
Journal of Legal Studies 413 (1997); Jeffrey S. Parker, “Daubert’s Debut: The
Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial
System,” 1995 Supreme Court Economic Review 1; Richard A. Posner, Economic
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neither exhaustive nor definitive) economic analysis of that law. It is
in three parts. The first part proposes and elaborates an economic
model (actually two models, a search model and a cost-minimization
model) of evidence. The second part examines the basic structure
and structural rules of the evidence-gathering process; it includes an
economic comparison between the “inquisitorial” and “adversarial”
systems of justice and an analysis of issues relating to burden of
proof. The third part is an economic appraisal of salient provisions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the most influential American
codification of such rules; it also takes up some issues of evidentiary
privilege and exclusion that the rules do not deal with explicitly.
Like many other economic studies of the legal system, mine
concludes that the institutional and doctrinal structure of the
American law of evidence has a subtle, though intuitive, implicit,
and incomplete, economic logic. This conclusion will startle. Most
evidence professors, and even a few judges,3 would, if asked, say that
of course the American system of finding facts at trial is inefficient,
ludicrously so, and redeemed if at all by the noneconomic values that
the system protects. But that assessment is founded on incomplete
analysis and on misleading anecdotage4 that is itself an artifact of a
worthwhile feature of the American system—the high degree of
public scrutiny that it invites and enables. Neither cheap nor highly
Analysis of Law 600–605, 621, 647, 749–752 (5th ed. 1998); Chris William
Sanchirico, “Games, Information and Evidence Production, with Application
to Legal History and ‘Decoupling’” (University of Southern California Law
School, unpublished, Oct. 1998); Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser,
“On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions,” 25 Journal of Legal
Studies 27 (1996); Peter T. Wendel, “A Law and Economics Analysis of the
Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation Post-Maryland v. Craig: Distinguishing
the Forest from the Trees,” 22 Hofstra Law Review 405 (1993); Symposium: The
Economics of Evidentiary Law, 19 Cardozo Law Review 1531 (1998); and for a
useful bibliography, see Jeffrey S. Parker and Bruce H. Kobayashi, “Evidence”
(forthcoming in Bibliography of Law and Economics). A larger literature deals
with issues in the economics of pretrial discovery and procedure generally that
somewhat overlap the issues discussed in this article (see Posner, above, ch. 21,
and references cited there).
3 For a classic statement, see Marvin E. Frankel, “The Search for Truth: A n
Umpireal View,” 123 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1031 (1975).
4 As pointed out in Marc Galanter, “An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary
Legends about the Civil Justice System,” 40 Arizona Law Review 717 (1998).
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accurate, our adversarial system is radically imperfect from the
Utopian standpoint so often, though mistakenly, used to evaluate
social institutions. Yet even from a perspective concerned only with
economic efficiency in the sense of wealth maximization or cost
minimization, it may not be inferior to the feasible alternatives, including the Continental inquisitorial system much touted in some
quarters of the American legal academy.
I both emphasize the close connection between rules of evidence and the use of the jury and make repeated reference to Bayes’
theorem. So let me make clear at the outset that I do not propose
that juries or judges be instructed in the elements of Bayesian theory
or mathematical probability more generally—or any other theory of
probability or evidence. Such efforts at formalizing the tacit, intuitive
inferential procedures employed at present to resolve factual disputes
in trials would cause endless confusion. Not only do few members of
the general population have even a rudimentary education in
mathematical probability theory, or in the theory of rational choice
that underlies both mathematical probability theory and economic
theory; but legal education itself (alas) also “produces no improvement in the ability to apply the statistical and methodological rules
of the probabilistic sciences to either scientific studies or everyday-life
events.”5 The value of Bayes’ theorem in the law of evidence is
strictly heuristic. The most influential model of rational decision
making under conditions of ineradicable uncertainty (conditions
which require that decision be based on subjective probabilities), it
can be of great help, as we shall see, in evaluating the rationality of
rules of evidence.
Although economic theory provides the framework of analysis
in this article, I draw heavily on an empirical literature on trials and
evidence that is largely psychological in orientation, as well as on
Bayes’ theorem, other aspects of decision theory, and statistical
inference. The approach is therefore eclectic rather than narrowly
economic, although it slights epistemological and other
philosophical perspectives on the trial process, which seem to me to
have only a very limited utility. The article’s explanatory findings and
5

Darrin R. Lehman, Richard O. Lempert, and Richard E. Nisbett, “The
Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking
about Everyday-Life Events,” 43 American Psychologist 431, 440 (1988).
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reformist suggestions are summarized in the Conclusion—a glance
at which will show that, despite the still widespread belief that
economic analysis of law has an inherent tendency toward politically
conservative reforms, this is clearly not true with regard to the law of
evidence.
I. The Economic Approach to Evidence
A. How to Proceed
There are many possible ways of coming to grips with the
economic issues that the law of evidence presents. The simplest
would be to take up the various rules piecemeal and examine their
economizing properties. Another way would be to deduce the
optimal system of dispute resolution from economic theory and
compare it with the actual systems in use in this and other countries.
A third would be to begin with the epistemological and
psychological literatures dealing with rational inquiry.6 A fourth
would be to build from what is now an extensive empirical literature
on the actual operation of the various methods (especially the jury,
the focus of this literature) for determining facts at trial.7 A fifth
would be to see how the private sector resolves disputes and to use its
6 A good recent treatise on rational decision making is David A. Schum, The
Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning (1994); and with specific
reference to the pros and cons of a Bayesian approach to the law of evidence,
see Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses and Limits of
Bayesianism (Peter Tillers and Eric D. Green eds. 1988). Helpful discussions
of the cognitive quirks that impede rational decision making include Detlof von
Winterfeldt and Ward Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research, ch.
13 (1986); Albert J. Moore, “Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the
Courtroom,” 37 UCLA Law Review 273 (1989), and especially Richard Nisbett
and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment
(1980). I discuss some of the epistemological issues involved in the use of the
legal process to make factual determinations in my book The Problems of
Jurisprudence 203–219 (1990), but I no longer agree with everything I said
there, particularly my criticisms of the jury system.
7 This literature is well illustrated by Michael J. Saks, “What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us about How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?” 6 Southern
California Interdisciplinary Journal 1 (1997), and by Richard Lempert, “Civil
Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years,” in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 181 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993).
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methods as a model, since private dispute resolvers have stronger
incentives than public ones to maximize the net benefits of the
dispute-resolution process. A sixth approach would be to examine all
the possible goals of the law of evidence and try to establish the
weight that economic goals should be given.
None of these approaches can be disregarded in a responsible
economic analysis of evidence, and I shall touch on all of them at
some point in this article. It seems best to begin at an abstract level
(the second approach sketched above), by asking: if we were writing
on a clean slate and trying to design a system for the resolution of
factual disputes in litigation that would be economically efficient in
the broadest sense, how would we frame our inquiry? I propose two
ways, which are equivalent.
B. The Search Model
The first way is to model factfinding as a problem in search,
analogous to searching for a consumer durable,8 with the correct
answer to the question of (say) did X shoot Y? corresponding to the
utility-maximizing choice between two brands of dishwasher.9 It is
only an analogy. Not only are the incentives of the participants not
the same in the two search processes; but external effects are also
more likely in the case of the evidence search. I shall try to account
for the differences later.
The search process, which in the litigation setting is the process
of obtaining, sifting, marshaling, presenting, and (for the trier of
fact) weighing evidence, confers benefits and incurs costs. (Social
and private benefits and costs must be distinguished, but that is for
later.) Benefits are a positive function of the probability (p) that if
the evidence is considered by the trier of fact the case will be decided
correctly, and of the stakes (S) in the case. To keep things simple, I
shall assume that the benefits are simply the product of the two
8

See, for example, Sridhar Moorthy, Brian T. Ratchford, and Debabrata
Talukdar, “Consumer Information Search Revisited: Theory and Empirical
Analysis,” 23 Journal of Consumer Research 263 (1997); Asher Wolinsky,
“Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services,” 24 RAND Journal of
Economics 380 (1993).
9 A dichotomous choice is assumed in both the legal and consumer examples
for the sake of simplicity; nothing of analytical relevance turns on the
assumption.
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terms, hence pS, where p is a positive function of the amount of
evidence (x), so that the full expression for the benefits of the search
is p(x)S. With enough evidence, p might equal 1, meaning that a
trial would be certain to produce the correct outcome. The costs of
the trial (c) are also a positive function of the amount of evidence (x).
Some of these assumptions will have to be relaxed later, but for
now, the net benefits (B(x)) of what I am calling the “evidence
search” in a case are given by
(1)

B(x) = p(x)S – c(x)

and thus the optimum amount of search—the amount that maximizes net benefits—satisfies
(2)

p x S = cx

where the subscripts denote derivatives. In words, the search should
be carried to the point at which marginal cost and marginal benefit
are equated. The amount of evidence at the optimum point will be
greater the higher the stakes in the case, the lower the cost of
obtaining evidence, and the greater the effect of evidence in
increasing the likelihood of an accurate outcome.
For this optimum to exist, it is enough if p(x) is increasing at a
decreasing rate (pxx < 0) and that cx is nondecreasing (cxx ≥ 0).10

10

The second condition implies that there are no economies of scale i n
searching for evidence. A simple version of Equation (1) that satisfies both
conditions is
(1a) B(x) = (x/(x + 1))S – cx
where p takes the specific value of x/(x + 1) and c(x) the specific value of cx
(constant costs). The optimum amount of evidence (x*) is then
(2b) x* = (S/c)1/2 – 1
and is greater the higher the ratio of the stakes in the case to the unit cost of
the evidence. But notice that it increases at a diminishing rate as that ratio
rises.
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These conditions are plausible. Begin with the benefits side: As
more and more evidence is obtained, the effect of additional evidence
on the outcome of the case will tend to decrease, especially if the
searcher begins the search with the most probative evidence, and
that will be the rational procedure unless that evidence is particularly
costly to obtain. But this is a rather crude description of a complex
process and let me complicate it a bit, using a search model developed
by Martin Weitzman.11 Suppose there are n possible sources of evidence, the sources are independent of each other (that is, discovering
valuable evidence in one does not help you find valuable evidence in
any other), and each source has a known probability (p) of containing valuable evidence, a known value (V) of that evidence should it
turn out to be contained in the source, and a cost (c) of exploring the
source to discover whether it does contain the evidence. Then for
each source there will be an expected net gain from searching of pV
– c. If we are searching among the sources for the best one (for example, the best expert witness for our case, or the best character
witness, or, in general, one witness or document where there are
alternative possibilities), rather than seeking to cumulate evidence, it
can be shown that we should continue the search until we find a
source that yields evidence having a V (call it V*) that exceeds (pV –
c)/p for all the unsearched sources. Since (pV – c)/p is, equivalently,
V – c/p, and V > c/p for all c > 0, this means stopping at the first
success if each success has the same evidentiary value. In the event of
failure, we should next explore the source having the highest p
(assuming constant V and c), lowest c, or highest V.
If the searcher cannot determine in advance which evidence is
most likely to be fruitful, his search procedure will resemble random
sampling, and as the size of a sample grows, the value of additional
sampling in conducing to a more accurate result rises at a falling rate.
(Roughly speaking, accuracy increases by the square root of the
sample size.) So, under either this or the previous model (or other
plausible models of the search for evidence), there will be declining
The condition that cx be nondecreasing is not strictly necessary. It is
enough if it decreases less rapidly than the benefits of the search decrease, so
that pxxS < cxx.
11 Martin L. Weitzman, “Optimal Search for the Best Alternative,” 47
Econometrica 641, 646–648 (1979).
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marginal utility of search. Indeed, as we shall see, beyond some point
the marginal utility of additional searching for evidence may turn
negative. But there will be little tendency for the cost of additional
searching to fall as the search widens, and it may well begin to rise,
as the initial leads run out. I say “little,” not “no,” for two reasons.
First, a heavy initial investment in evidence gathering may generate
leads that, for a time, enable the searcher to obtain additional evidence at low cost. Second, when aggregated over all cases, the cost
of searching for evidence may actually fall with increases in the
amount of evidence obtained, though only up to a point. More
accurate factfinding increases deterrence of wrongful conduct,
which in turn reduces the number of cases and hence the aggregate
costs of the legal process.
To see how accuracy in factfinding relates to deterrence, notice
that the expected cost of punishment (EC) is actually the difference
between the expected cost of punishment if one commits a crime
(ECg = pgS, where pg is the probability of punishment if the accused is guilty and S is the sentence) and the expected cost of
punishment if one does not commit a crime (ECi = piS where pi is
the probability of punishment if the accused is guilty and S is as
before). Hence EC = pgS – piS; equivalently, EC = (pg – pi)S,
making it transparent that if punishment is imposed randomly, so
that the probability of punishment is the same regardless of guilt
(that is, if pg = pi), the expected punishment cost for committing the
crime will be zero. The more accurate the process of determining
guilt is, the less random punishment will be, and so the greater will
be the law’s deterrent effect.12 To put this point differently, greater
accuracy in the determination of guilt increases the returns to being
innocent.
The point is not limited to criminal law. It applies to all areas of
law in which deterrence of unlawful behavior is an important
objective. It shows what a good investment expenditures on evidence
can be. Granted, there is a danger of exaggeration if one fails to
distinguish between punishment that is truly random and punishment that merely has a random component. Suppose that a
person with a criminal record is quite likely to be convicted of any
12

Posner, note 1 above, at 412.
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subsequent crime that he is charged with even if he did not commit
that crime. This will reduce the effect of the criminal law in
deterring him from committing subsequent crimes. At the same
time, it will increase deterrence against his committing the first
crime, and it will also cause people with a criminal record to steer
clear of activities in which they might be arrested and falsely
charged. So inaccuracy can increase as well as reduce deterrence.13
But probably (though this can only be a guess) the latter effect will
predominate in most cases, even that of convicting second and other
subsequent offenders of crimes they have not committed. If the law
enforcement authorities concentrate their limited resources on such
offenders because they are easier to convict regardless of guilt, the
expected punishment of first offenders will decline because the
authorities will devote fewer resources to prosecuting them.
Deterrence plays a starring role in the economic analysis of
evidence because it links the concern with accuracy that is so central
to the evidentiary process with the economist’s conception of law as
a system for creating incentives for efficient conduct. Since the
accurate determination of facts at trial is important to the efficacy of
law in imparting efficient incentives, accuracy in adjudication is an
economic as well as moral and political value.
C. The Cost-Minimization Model
An alternative way of modeling the search for evidence, one
that derives from familiar economic models of procedure and of
negligence,14 is as a process of cost minimization. Let p now be the
probability of an erroneous rather than of a correct outcome, and pS
the cost of the error (the probability of error weighted by the stakes).
Suppose that p = .1, implying that, on average, one of ten cases will
be decided incorrectly. If the average stakes in these cases are
$100,000, then the expected cost of error is $10,000. The specific
assumption (that pS equals the social costs of error) is arbitrary. But
13

For other examples of how inaccuracy in adjudication can actually enhance
social welfare, see Michael L. Davis, “The Value of Truth and Optimal
Standards of Proof in Legal Disputes,” 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 343 (1994).
14 See Posner, note 1 above, at 401 (procedure); William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 58–60 (1987)
(negligence).
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it is a reasonable guess that the social cost of an erroneous outcome
will generally rise with the dollar equivalent of the stakes in the case.
I will both defend and qualify this assumption shortly.
The social goal of the evidentiary process is to minimize the sum
of the cost of error and the cost of error avoidance, that is, to
minimize
(3)

C(x) = p(x)S + c(x)

Formally this is done by differentiating C(x) with respect to x and
setting the result equal to zero, yielding
(4)

–pxS = cx

That is, the search for evidence should be carried to the point at
which the last bit of evidence obtained yields a reduction in error
costs equal to the cost of obtaining the evidence. For this optimum
to exist, it is enough if increases in x have a diminishing effect in
reducing pS and if, as before, cx is nondecreasing.
D. Some Additional Observations about the Models
“Costs” may seem too narrow a concept to serve as a criterion for
choosing among alternative rules of evidence. However, this
objection may rest on too narrow a concept of “costs.” The costs of
evidence search, in a proper economic analysis, are not limited to
time and other direct costs. They include indirect costs resulting
from the incentive effects of the search process. Consider the rule
that forbids the use of evidence that after the accident giving rise to
the plaintiff’s suit the defendant repaired the condition that caused
the accident. The primary concern is that the admissibility of such
evidence would, by discouraging repairs, increase the risk of future
accidents. Law professors like to emphasize the indirect costs of rules
of evidence, but by arguing that the law of evidence has multiple
goals15 rather than just the goal of accuracy in factfinding. The
15

See, for example, Michael L. Seigel, “A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship,” 88 Northwestern University Law Review 995 (1994), and
references cited, including influential articles by Lawrence Tribe and Charles
Nesson.
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economist will agree that accuracy (p in Equations (1) through (4))
is not the only goal. Indeed, it is better described not as a goal at all,
but rather as one of the factors that determines the net benefits of a
search for evidence. The other goals discussed in the evidence literature, such as providing catharsis to quarreling parties, resolving
disputes in a manner acceptable to the community, safeguarding
interests in personal liberty, and protecting other values (as in the
subsequent-repair example) are likewise best regarded not as distinct
goals but rather as factors influencing one term or another in the
basic equations. Not only can noneconomic concerns thus be accommodated within a framework of economic analysis; but the basic
insight of that analysis, as applied to evidence law—that the law is
engaged in making tradeoffs between the accuracy and cost of
trials—is also a familar and even orthodox theme in noneconomic
writing about evidence law.16 The economic approach serves more
to refine and extend than to challenge the intuitions of the legal
professional.
I can be a little more precise about how additional evidence
nudges a factual inquiry toward an accurate conclusion. In the most
intuitive version of Bayes’s theorem, the posterior odds (the odds
after a new piece of evidence, x, is considered) that some hypothesis
(say that X shot Y) is correct are obtained by multiplying the prior
odds by the ratio of (1) the probability that the evidence would have
been observed if the hypothesis were true to (2) the probability that
the evidence would be observed if the hypothesis were not true, as in
(5)

Ω(H|x) = L x Ω(H)

where Ω is odds,17 H is hypothesis, and L (the likelihood ratio) is
p(x|H)/p(x|˜H). Suppose that the new piece of evidence is testimony
16

See, for example, Jon O. Newman, “Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on
the Litigation Process,” 94 Yale Law Journal 1643, 1647–1650 (1985).
17 Ω(H|x) = p(H|x)/p(˜H|x), and Ω(H) = p(H)/p(˜H). The tilde (˜) means
“not.” So if, in the example in the text, the probability, given X shot Y, that Z
would testify that he saw the shooting is .4, and the probability that, given X
did not shoot Y, Z would nevertheless testify that he saw him do it is .1, then
the odds that X shot Y are 4 to 1 (or, equivalently, 4). If (before Z’s testimony)
the probability that X shot Y was .1 and the probability that he did not .2, the
odds that X shot Y (the prior odds) would be 1 to 2 (or .5).
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by bystander Z that he saw X shoot Y. Suppose further that the
prior odds (Ω(H)) are 1 to 2 that X shot Y, while the probability
that Z would testify that he saw X shoot Y if X did shoot Y is .8,
and the probability that he would testify that he saw X shoot Y if X
did not shoot Y is .1, so that the likelihood ratio is 8. The posterior
odds that X shot Y will therefore be 4 to 1.
Several qualifications should be noted. One is that the stakes in
a case are an imperfect measure of the social benefits of additional
evidence gathering. Imagine a dispute over liability under a statute
that was repealed after the dispute arose but that still, not having
been repealed retroactively, governs the dispute. If a lot of money is
involved, the optimum private investment in evidence gathering
may be very large because victory will confer (or conserve) substantial
economic rents; and yet the social benefits from a correct decision
might be nil—or might not be; the expectation that any dispute
arising under the statute would be resolved by accurate methods,
come what may, might have induced efficient behavior when the
statute was in force.
The broader point is that the parties may underinvest in the
search for evidence in some cases because accuracy in adjudication
confers benefits on nonparties by increasing the deterrent efficacy of
the law, while overinvesting in others for rent-seeking reasons. But
it is a reasonable conjecture that in general, if not in every case, the
larger the stakes the more important it is from a social as well as a
private standpoint that the case be decided correctly. If inaccuracy reduces deterrence and hence compliance with law, it will impose
greater social costs the bigger the case. It is more important to deter
billion-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence than million-dollar
oil spills resulting from negligence.
A second qualification is that altering posterior odds may not
have much or even any social value even if the likelihood ratio of the
new evidence is high, as in our shooting example, where it was 8.
The value of the evidence will depend on the prior odds and on the
decision rule. Suppose that the prior odds (as a consequence of the
previously presented evidence) that X shot Y are not 1 to 2 but 1 to
10 and that for X to be held liable for the shooting the trier of fact
must consider the odds that he did it to be at least 1.01 to 1 (the
preponderance standard). Then the new evidence, since it would not
lift the posterior odds above the threshold (multiplying the prior

13

Economics of Evidence

odds by a likelihood ratio of 8 yields posterior odds of only 1 to 1.25),
would have no value. This would also be the case if, with the prior
odds unchanged at 1 to 2, the trier of fact must reckon the odds to
be at least 9 to 1 (one possible interpretation of the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard) in order to find against X; for the
posterior odds are only 4 to 1.
A final qualification is that investments in evidence may yield
benefits that go beyond altering the outcome of particular cases.
Take the simple case in which the outcome depends solely on the
ratio of the investments of each side; A, say, will beat B if A spends
twice as much as B; otherwise B will win. Then a proportional
reduction in each side’s expenditures will not alter the outcome. But
it may well reduce the amount of information generated for the
consideration of the tribunal, and by doing so may increase the
variance of the actual as distinct from the expected outcome and also
increase the likelihood of an appeal by reducing confidence in the
accuracy of the outcome.
II. The Structure of the Factual Inquiry
A. Inquisitorial versus Adversarial Systems, with Special Reference to
the American Jury
1. The “Pure” Systems Compared
The benefits and costs of searching for evidence, and so the
optimal kind and amount of such search, vary with the type of
searcher. Begin with the case in which the only searcher is a professional judge. That is a caricature of the inquisitorial system that
prevails in Continental Europe, Japan, and most other nonEnglish-speaking countries, for although lawyers play a smaller role
in developing evidence in an inquisitorial system than they do in an
adversarial one, it is not trivial (it also varies from country to
country). But I wish to make the contrast between the systems as
stark as possible, and so I shall treat tendencies as if they were their
extremes.18 Therefore I shall not only ignore the role of the lawyer
18

The very simplest example of factual inquiry would be that of a parent investigating a dispute between two of his or her children. Bentham seems to
have considered this the appropriate model for the system of legal evidence,
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as an evidence searcher in this inquisitorial system, but also treat trial
by jury as the sole form of trial in the adversarial system.
It might appear that our searcher-judge would be an extremely
efficient searcher, because of selection, training, and experience.19
But maybe not. Since it is difficult to evaluate legal factfinding and
thus to criticize a judge for having made erroneous findings or praise
him for good ones, the judge’s incentive to exert himself to do a
good job will be limited. In addition, if he is highly paid, the cost of
search may be substantial. The amount of search conducted,
moreover, will depend on the number of judges and auxiliary judicial
personnel, and that number may be determined without much
regard to the socially optimal amount of search. In addition, the
public may lack confidence in the judge’s search and in the
conclusions he draws from it because the process of judicial inquiry
in an inquisitorial system, like grand jury proceedings in the United
States, is carried on mainly behind closed doors. And there is a
danger that the judge will render the “popular” result in a case,
irrespective of justice.
In the adversarial process exemplified by the modern American
civil jury trial, the evidence search is conducted separately by the
lawyers for the opposing sides and presented to a nonexpert, ad hoc,
multiheaded tribunal for decision. Because trial lawyers are
compensated directly or indirectly on the basis of success at trial,
their incentive to develop evidence favorable to their client and to
find the flaws in the opponent’s evidence is very great and if it is a
big money case their resources for obtaining and contesting evidence
though not a model to be followed slavishly. See Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of
Judicial Evidence, vol. 1, pp. 6–8 (J. S. Mill ed. 1827). See generally Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, “Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the Law of Evidence:
From Bentham to the ADR Movement,” 25 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
837 (1992). For descriptions of the differences between adversarial and
inquisitorial handling of evidence problems, see Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidence
Law Adrift (1997); John H. Langbein, “The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure,” 52 University of Chicago Law Review 823 (1985); David Luban,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 93–103 (1988).
19 It is conventionally remarked, as though the point were obvious, that the
inquisitorial approach is “more efficient” than the adversarial approach. E.g.,
Craig M. Bradley, “The Convergence of the Continental and the Common
Law Model of Criminal Procedure,” 7 Criminal Law Forum 471 (1997). This
article challenges that assumption.
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will be ample. If the size of the stakes in a case is at least a rough
proxy for the social costs of an inaccurate decision, there will be at
least a rough alignment between the amount of search that is
actually conducted and the amount that is socially optimal.
It is true that the amount of search is driven not by the stakes
alone but also by the likely effect of the marginal bit of evidence on
the outcome. Recall from Equation (2) that the marginal benefit of
a piece of evidence is given by pxS, where px is the effect of the
evidence on the probability that the trial will reach the right result
(whether from a social or, as here, where we are considering the
incentives of lawyers rather than judges, a private standpoint). This
implies that, other things being equal, more evidence will be
obtained the closer the case is.20 The closer the case, the more of an
effect on the outcome additional evidence is likely to have and so the
more likely such evidence is to be furnished to the trier of fact. If the
case is one sided, additional evidence, even though highly probative
considered by itself, may have no effect on the outcome.
The incentive to present more evidence the closer the case is
(other things being equal) has a tendency to promote efficiency, but
no stronger statement is possible. It is easy to imagine cases in which
the additional evidence induced by the closeness of the case has no
social product. Suppose that party A can increase the probability of a
favorable outcome by 1 percent by adducing one more bit of evidence
at cost X. And suppose that his opponent, B, can nullify that 1
percent shift in A’s favor by adding another bit of evidence, evidence
favorable to B, also at cost X. If each party puts in his additional
evidence, a cost of 2X will be incurred without any change in the
expected outcome. The example, however, is somewhat unrealistic.
If A can anticipate B’s response, A has no incentive to put in the
additional evidence. A and B will jointly benefit from agreeing to
keep the evidence out.21
The competitive character of the search process and the presentation of the results to a body of amateur judges (the jurors) that
20

See also Avery Katz, “Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure,”
8 International Review of Law and Economics 127 (1988).
21 A stipulation (agreement) of the parties to limit evidence will normally be
enforced. If lawyers were perfect agents of their clients, such stipulations would
be more common than they are; but they are common.
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does not itself participate in the gathering of the evidence makes it
difficult to situate the adversarial system on a continuum with the
inquisitorial. The model for the latter is a police investigation, but
for the former it is the debate. The debater’s tools are the tools of
rhetoric, the set of techniques for inducing belief in matters
involving irremediable uncertainty often because of the lack of
sophistication of the audience. As emphasized by theorists of
rhetoric beginning with Aristotle, an important dimension of
effective rhetoric (called the “ethical appeal”) is making the speaker,
as well as the speech, credible. The economics of consumer search
sketched in Part I again provides a helpful parallel.22 Some
consumer goods are what are called in economics “credence goods.”
A good is a credence good if the consumer cannot readily determine
its quality by inspection or even use, so that he has to take its quality
“on faith.” The importance of credibility in a rhetorical system of
justice, and the incentives of lawyers to enhance the credibility of
their witnesses without regard for the truth, explain the emphasis
that adversary systems place on cross-examination and rebuttal, and
the corresponding suspicion of hearsay evidence, which, defined
functionally, is simply testimony that is not subject to cross-examination.23
The significance of cross-examination is often misunderstood,
and its social value consequently underappreciated, because of failure
to consider the deterrent effect of the right of cross-examination.
Because cross-examination can destroy a witness’s credibility, it rarely
does so in practice, and so is mistakenly denigrated. The witness
whose credibility would be destroyed by cross-examination will not
be called at all, or will try to pull the sting of the cross-examiner by
acknowledging on direct examination the facts that a cross-examiner
could be expected to harp on.
The adversary system makes it difficult for litigants to signal the
strength of their case. Just as poker players must bluff occasionally to
avoid revealing the strength of their hand and thus losing the
strategic advantage of secrecy, so lawyers who have weak cases must
22

For a fuller discussion, see Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law, ch. 24
(1995).
23 The witness can be cross-examined, but not the out-of-court declarant
whose “testimony” the witness is repeating.
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pretend to have a strong case in order to avoid tipping their hand.
One might expect, however, that some lawyers would specialize in
strong cases, so that the fact that the lawyer had been retained
would signal that the case was strong, and thus induce a favorable
settlement. This would be a cheap and reliable method of signaling.
But I do not think it is widespread.
The adversary system may seem less efficient than the inquisitorial merely because it involves two searchers—the counsel for the
opposing sides—rather than one (the judge). There is duplication
and hence there are added costs. And because the searchers are not
disinterested, the system needs procedures hfor preventing
concealment and distortion of evidence. When permitted to do so,
as they are in the American legal system, lawyers assist (some would
say they coach) their witnesses to make the witness’s story credible;
lawyers understand the importance to effective rhetoric of the ethical
appeal. Such assistance is not altogether a bad thing. It can remind
the witness of true facts that he may have forgotten, help him to
articulate his recollections in an intelligible form, and show him
how to testify in compliance with the rules of evidence.
Because the private benefits of searching for evidence may
exceed or fall short of the social benefits, privatizing the search (as in
the adversarial system) may result in too much or too little evidence
from a social standpoint, as we have seen, whereas in principle (a
tremendous qualification, however) the inquisitorial judge can
continue his search for evidence until he reaches the point at which
marginal cost and marginal benefit intersect and he can stop right
there. The judge in the adversary system can, however, limit the
amount of search. He can do this not only by curtailing pretrial
discovery, setting an early trial date, and limiting the length of the
trial (all measures that judges in our system are authorized to
employ), but also by excluding evidence at trial under the authority of
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (It is true that by the
time a Rule 403 motion is made, the evidence will be gathered. But
parties are unlikely to gather evidence if they expect the judge to
exclude it at trial.) The relevance and hearsay rules also conduce to
this end. The function of the rules of evidence in limiting the

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

18

external costs generated by an adversary system is one reason why
such rules are less important in an inquisitorial system.24
The law cannot force the parties to search more than the case is
worth to them merely because the additional search would confer a
social benefit. But it can force them to collect somewhat more
evidence than they might do if left to their own devices, as we shall
see when we consider the rules governing the burden of production.
Because the jury is an ad hoc tribunal, a significant amount of
time is consumed at the outset of trial in the selection of the members of the tribunal. And because it is inexperienced, a professional
judge is needed to guide it, and the pace of the trial is slowed down
by the need to educate the jurors in the rudiments of their job. In
the federal courts, civil jury trials are on average more than twice as
long as civil bench (that is, judge) trials.25 So there is no saving of
judge time by employing a jury; rather the contrary, though with
some offset because the judge does not have to actually decide the
case or write an opinion. The rules of evidence, it is frequently
argued, would be largely unnecessary if there were no jury trials; they
are mainly designed to protect laymen from making cognitive errors
as a result of inexperience. And so the formulation and application of
those rules are another cost of trial by jury.
Trial by jury also magnifies differences in ability between opposing counsel, because the judge, for fear of interfering with the jury’s
decision making, cannot easily redress the balance by questioning the
witnesses himself or suggesting lines of argument, as he could in a
bench trial. This is not entirely a bad thing, because trial by jury
penalizes bad lawyers more than nonjury trials do, and so might
24

See Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure
151–157 (1980); Franklin Steir, “What Can the American Adversary System
Learn from an Inquisitorial System of Justice?” 76 Judicature 109 (1992);
Konstantinos D. Kerameus, “A Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common Law
Procedure,” 47 Louisiana Law Review 497, 500 (1987). An alternative approach
would be a regulatory (“Pigouvian”) tax on evidence; but there would have to be
a subsidy for those cases in which the parties underinvest in evidence from a
social standpoint. The implementation of such a tax-subsidy scheme would,
unfortunately, require far more information than the government could feasibly
obtain.
25 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 193 n. 1
(1996).
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produce, in Darwinian fashion, a higher quality of lawyer than
bench trials in which the judge seeks to compensate for the
inadequacies of the weaker lawyer. Yet “goodness” here includes the
unscrupulous mastery of deceitful rhetorical tricks. Finally, and
seemingly most tellingly, it may seem obvious that the jurors’
inexperience and naiveté will reduce the likelihood of an outcome
that corresponds to the true facts of the case. Not only do the jurors
have higher information costs than professional judges do; they may
be more subject to cognitive illusions and emotionalism than a professional judge who has “seen it all before.”
But this is only part of the picture. The competitive character of
the adversary process gives the searchers (the lawyers) greater
incentives to search hard than under a system in which the judge is
the principal or only searcher.26 Competition always involves
duplication of effort, yet more often than not yields more than
offsetting benefits, and it may do so in a trial. To put this point
differently, the adversarial system relies on the market to a much
greater extent than the inquisitorial system does, and the market is a
more efficient producer of most goods than the government is.
Professor Langbein, a distinguished defender of the inquisitorial
approach, recognizes that the adversarial approach has the advantage
that it “aligns responsibility with incentive” and “is an undoubted
safeguard against official sloth,” but offers a “straightforward” answer
to this concern: “The judicial career must be designed in a fashion
that creates incentives for diligence and excellence.”27 This is easier
said than done, and may in fact be quite infeasible in America’s
political culture.28 Some evidence of this is the widespread
dissatisfaction with American administrative agencies, which employ
methods and procedures (expert judges, no jurors, relaxed rules of
evidence, and more control by the tribunal over evidence gathering)
that somewhat resemble those of inquisitorial systems.

26

See Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, “Advocates” (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles, March 6, 1998, forthcoming in Journal of Political
Economy).
27 Langbein, note 18 above, at 848.
28 As argued in John C. Reitz, “Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure,” 75 Iowa Law Review 987 (1990).
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We must not rest, however, on a dogmatic preference for
market allocation of resources, but must consider concretely how
competition might conduce to optimal evidence gathering. It might
do this not only by inducing greater efforts by each side to find evidence than a judge in an inquisitorial system would exert, but also by
inducing greater efforts to find the flaws in the other side’s
evidence.29 Not greater efforts across the board; rather, as I have also
pointed out, greater efforts the larger the stakes and the closer the
case, hence greater in those cases where a more thorough and careful
marshaling and evaluation of evidence is likely to confer greater
social benefits. In general, moreover, the party having the objectively
stronger case will be able to obtain evidence favorable to it at lower
cost than the opposing party can obtain evidence favorable to
itself.30 So the competitive system of gathering evidence will tend to
favor the party who would win in an error-free world.31
The adversarial system also facilitates the drawing of reliable
inferences from evidentiary lacunae.32 If one party ought to be able
to obtain favorable evidence to itself at low cost, then its failure to
present such evidence allows the trier of fact to infer that the party is
concealing unfavorable evidence and should therefore lose.
Although the average juror may be less bright, and will certainly
be less experienced in adjudication, than the average judge, “two
29

The latter point is emphasized in Giuliana Palumbo, “Optimal ‘Excessive’
Litigation in Adversarial Systems” (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles,
working paper no. 98–01, June 1998).
30 Ideally, the cost of producing favorable evidence should be infinite to the
party who deserves to lose. If it were, the fact that parties have incentives to lie
under a regime of competitive evidence gathering would not lead to erroneous
results. See Chris William Sanchirico, “Enforcement by Hearing: A n
Integrated Model of Evidence Production” (Columbia University Dept. of
Econ. and Law School, unpublished, Dec. 1997).
31 Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi, “Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian:
Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?” 12 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 257 (1996). See also Paul Milgrom and John Roberts,
“Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,” 17 Rand Journal of Economics 18 (1986).
32 See Hyun Song Shin, “Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration,” 29 RAND Journal of Economics 378, 404 (1998) (in an adversarial
systeym, “the absence of a conclusive submission by either the plaintiff or
defendant can be treated as a signal in itself”).
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heads are better than one”—and 6, 8, or 12 inexperienced heads may
be better than the one experienced head when they pool their recollections and deliberate to an outcome. The judge does not merely
preside, moreover; he can take the case away from the jury by
granting a new trial or, if the evidence is completely one-sided, a
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, if the jury
seems to him to have screwed up. The 12 heads are really 13. And
depending on the type of case, the jurors may be more like the
witnesses and parties, in terms of social background, occupation,
education, life experience, race, mores, and outlook, than the judge
is. That may make it easier for them to understand, and to
determine the credibility of, the witnesses than it is for the judge to
do so. This is likeliest to be true in personal-injury tort cases and in
criminal cases, but together these two categories account for most
jury trials.33
And if judges as well as jurors are prone to make cognitive errors
or be overcome by emotion, then trial by jury may actually proceed
more rationally than trial by judge, since in the latter form of trial
there is no gatekeeper protecting the trier of fact from confusing or
excessively prejudicial evidence. The point is less that we need rules
of evidence because we have juries than that we have no mechanism
for enforcing rules of evidence against judges. There would have to
be a screening judge to keep inadmissible evidence from the trial
judge. He would be humiliated by being deemed unable to keep
inadmissible evidence of which he was aware from influencing his
decision. But probably he would be unable to keep from being
influenced by such evidence. Indeed, it isn’t even certain that judges
are less prone to cognitive illusions than jurors. The literature on
these illusions provides some basis for thinking that market settings
33

In the most recent year for which statistics are available (1996 for state cases,
1997 for federal), 74 percent of all jury trials in the United States were either
personal-injury tort cases, or criminal cases. Computed from Brian J. Ostrom
and Neal B. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1996: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 25, 28 (1997); Judicial Business of the
United States Courts: 1997 Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 152–154, 359–361 (1997) (tabs. C–4, T–1). The state figure
on which this estimate is based is only an approximation, however, as there is
no comprehensive “personal injury” category, which I therefore approximated
as the sum of “auto [torts]” and “medical malpractice.”
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tend to dispel or at least reduce them,34 but none for thinking that
government processes have similar effects.35 We shall see, however,
that there is at least a small amount of evidence that judges are less
prone to cognitive illusions than juries are.
Gatekeeping is one way of combating cognitive illusions;
another is the adversary process itself. If the lawyer for one party uses
“framing” to influence a witness’s testimony, the other lawyer can on
cross-examination reframe the question to offset the effect of his
opponent’s framing. This is another respect in which the adversarial
system (with jury) may be better at dealing with cognitive illlusions
than the inquisitorial system.
Jurors have, moreover, a certain freshness that many judges lack.
The judge may be case-hardened and therefore less likely to attend
to the particulars of a new case. Bayes’ theorem shows that the
judge’s behavior may be quite rational. The higher one’s prior odds,
the less search a Bayesian will do, other things being equal. Suppose
a judge, by virtue of having presided in many similar cases, reckons at
the outset of a new case that the odds that the defendant is guilty are
100 to 1. He will have little incentive to pay close attention to the
evidence presented at trial, because evidence of the defendant’s guilt
will not alter the judge’s judgment, while evidence of the defendant’s
innocence, unless extremely powerful, will not push the judge’s
posterior odds into the range in which he would acquit the defendant. For example, if in the case in which the judge’s prior odds
are 100 to 1 in favor of guilt the evidence creates a likelihood ratio of
8 to 1 that the defendant is not guilty, the judge’s posterior odds on
guilt will still be 12.5 to 1.
All this is perfectly rational. But when the pattern becomes
understood, litigants will no longer have an incentive to produce
much evidence. (To see this, think of the extreme case where the
judge has made up his mind irrevocably about the correct outcome of
34

See, for example, Vernon L. Smith, “Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology,” 99 Journal of Political Economy 877 (1991);
Colin Camerer, “Individual Decision Making,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 587, 674–675 (John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth eds. 1995).
35 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, “A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics,” 50 Stanford Law Review 1471, 1543–1545
(1998).
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the case before any evidence is presented.) Eventually the accuracy of
the litigation process will be severely compromised, as the judge’s priors, formed on the basis of trials in which the parties did put in a lot
of evidence, become less and less accurate. The problem will be
aggravated if, as many cognitive psychologists believe, people are
afflicted by “confirmation bias,” meaning that they tend to interpret
evidence in the way most consistent with their priors. The fact that
the life-tenured judge on a fixed salary pays no penalty for succumbing to this bias undermines his resistance to it. The dangers
stemming from strong priors are less acute in trial by jury.
A related point is that judges by virtue of their experience may
take shortcuts to decision, while jurors, being new to the process,
may think more carefully about the evidence. The judge’s snap
decision may be as good as the jurors’ more deliberate one—but it
may not be better.
With its adversary character, and the need to present the evidence all at once (a jury can’t be kept together indefinitely, whereas
a judge can try a case in stages over an indefinite period of time and
delay issuing his decision until long after the trial has ended36), the
American jury trial is much more easily monitored by the public than
an inquisitorial process modeled on a police investigation. This is
important in a culture that distrusts officials—and so is the
delegation of a large part of the judicial function to nonofficials, the
jurors and the lawyers (though when representing the government
in court they usually are government employees). With so much of
the judicial function privatized, the number of professional judges required to staff the courts is much smaller than in inquisitorial
judiciaries,37 and this pattern caters to public mistrust of officialdom.
Another way of understanding the pattern is that a decision to have
36

Damaska, note 18 above, ch. 3, emphasizes the compression of the adversarial compared to the inquisitorial trial and attributes it to the jury. In the
United States as in Europe, judge trials tend to last longer from beginning to
end (although the amount of actual trial time is less) because, not having to
keep a jury together, the judge can interrupt the trial to attend to other
business.
37 For example, the ratio of lawyers to judges is 54.59 to 1 in the United States
compared to 6.07 to 1 in France, 6.86 to 1 in Germany, and 2.86 to 1 i n
Switzerland. Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America
28 (1996) (tab. 1.1).
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a small number of judges drives up the cost of search by them, so
that the search function devolves on others, the lawyers and jurors,
who might be considered excessively high-cost searchers (relative to
benefits) if judges were plentiful and judge search therefore cheap.
American popular mistrust of judges has a further significance.
It has resulted in most American judges’ being elected rather than
appointed and in keeping judicial salaries well below the opportunity
costs of the ablest lawyers. The consequence is a vicious cycle (vicious
if you don’t like juries). Because American judges are mistrusted,
American judges really are less trustworthy than judges in a culture
of greater respect for officials. This in turn narrows the competence
gap between judges and jurors, and so reduces the error costs of jury
trials relative to bench trials. The gap is further narrowed by the fact
that, when judges are elected, repeat litigants, such as insurance
companies, and specialized trial lawyers, such as the tort plaintiffs’
bar, have strong incentives to channel campaign contributions to
judges who favor their interests. The incentives are blunted, and the
bad effect on justice reduced, if decisional responsibility is shared
with jurors. A jury system counteracts judicial bias and reduces the
incentive to bribe judges.38 It counteracts political bias as well, a
potentially important factor especially in a system of elected judges,
as in most U.S. states. The judge who sits without a jury cannot
“blame” the result on others; he can diffuse responsibility if he sits
with a jury. And jurors unlike judges do not have career incentives to
render verdicts that are popular with whoever controls judicial
careers.
Doubts about the competence of jurors are influenced by the
assumption that jurors constitute a random sample of the lay population, but the assumption is false. In the federal system, the names of
potential jurors are usually taken from voter registration lists, so that
people whose sense of civic responsibility is insufficient to motivate
them to register to vote are in practice disqualified from serving on a
jury. The people whose names are chosen in this way are sent summonses to jury duty but the most irresponsible of these people simply
ignore them and there is rarely any follow-up. Then when the cooperators are questioned by the judge as part of the process of selecting the jury for the particular case, the potential jurors who do
38

Dewatripont and Tirole, note 26 above, at 30.
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not want to serve make up excuses and are usually let off. Challenges
for cause hive off the jurors who are likely to be partial to one side or
another, and peremptory challenges enable the lawyers to act on
inarticulable hunch to eliminate some of the prospective jurors who
remain. The prospects who make it through this gauntlet are not a
random sample of the inhabitants of the federal judicial district, but
generally are above average in competence, civic mindedness, and
sense of responsibility (except that peremptory challenges are
sometimes used to exclude the ablest prospective jurors—the ones
most likely to see through the case presented by the lawyer making
the challenge). Contrary to legend, retired people are underrepresented rather than overrepresented on juries.39 So, however, are
the busiest people, and some of them would make first-class jurors.
Even assuming that jurors are on balance as competent to resolve factual disputes as (American) judges, we might worry that
they have no incentive to exert themselves. They are less likely than
judges to be criticized publicly for reaching the “wrong” result
(though this, as we saw, can be a good thing as well as a bad); they
have no career stakes in doing their job as jurors well; and their
financial incentive to conduct a careful search of evidence is nil. Yet
almost all judges who sit with juries are struck by their
conscientiousness, whether or not the judge agrees with the jury’s
verdict. Part of the explanation is the screening for conscientiousness
that I have mentioned. More important is what might be called the
theatrics of trial by jury. American judicial systems strive, apparently
with some success, to create an atmosphere in which the jurors,
caught up in the drama of decision making, do their best to render a
sound verdict. This is no more (or less) surprising from the
standpoint of rational choice than the fact that an audience can be
frightened by a scary movie even though everyone knows that it’s
make-believe.
Well-publicized instances of crazy jury trials—interminable,
uncivil, lawless, resulting in outlandish verdicts and other egregious
miscarriages of justice, or all these things at once—have convinced

39

Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age 152 (1995).
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some observers that the American system is grossly inefficient.40 But
there are pitfalls in relying on anecdote to shape public policy in a
nation as vast and as blanketed by the media as the United States.
The very fact that the American jury trial facilitates public
evaluation—that the mistakes of the system are harder to
bury—guarantees that the system will look less efficient than one
that operates behind a veil.
2. Mixed Systems and Feasible Reform
For the sake of clarity I have been contrasting polar systems for
gathering and evaluating evidence in litigation—an inquisitorial
system without any participation by lawyers in the evidentiary
process and an adversarial system of jury trials. Actual systems are
mixed (lawyers do play an evidentiary role in the Continental legal
systems and only a small fraction of American cases are decided by
juries) and their best features could be combined. The jury could in
principle be abolished without jettisoning the adversary system, as
has essentially been done in civil cases in England, though I shall
note that England’s system is in other respects as well far from
adversary in the American sense. Or more cases channeled into arbitration, which mostly uses lay judges but ones who, unlike jurors,
have expertise. A number of suggested and some already implemented reforms of the adversary system and corresponding reforms
of the inquisitorial system41 offer promise of enhancing efficiency.
Here are some designed to make trial by jury more accurate:42
40

This position is argued from an economic standpoint in Gordon Tullock,
“Defending the Napoleonic Code over the Common Law,” 2 Research in Law
and Policy Studies 2 (1988), and in Tullock, note 24 above, ch. 6.
41 See, for example, Palumbo, note 29 above, at 2, 19–20. On the growing
convergence between the Continental (inquisitorial) and Anglo-American
(adversarial) systems, see, for example, Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Phil Fennell et al. eds. 1995); John D. Jackson, “Playing the Culture
Card in Resisting Cross-Jurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on ‘Legal
Processes and National Culture,’” 5 Cardozo Journal of International and
Comparative Law 51 (1997); Kerameus, note 24 above.
42 Many of these are discussed in Saks, note 7 above, and Lempert, note 7
above, at 220–231, and are summarized in American Bar Association, Section
of Litigation, “Civil Trial Practice Standards” (Feb. 1998). See also Michael
Honig, “Jury Trial Innovations,” New York Law Journal, Nov 9, 1998, p. 3.
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(1) Restoring the size of the civil jury to the traditional 12 (from
6 to 8, its size in the federal system at present), in order
(a) to obtain greater diversity of experience, which is important because determining probabilities with regard to the sorts of
uncertainty involved in a trial draws heavily on the adjudicator’s
common sense, which is shaped in turn by people’s experiences,
(b) to exploit the Condorcet jury theorem on the superiority
of collective to individual judgment,43 and
(c) to reduce variance in outcomes by drawing on a larger,
though still small, sample of the community.44
(2) Imposing educational qualifications on jurors in highly
complex litigation.
(3) Encouraging jurors to take a more active role in the search
process by permitting them
(a) to take notes,
(b) to ask questions of the lawyers, witnesses, and judge,
(c) to read daily transcript, and, more doubtfully,
(d) to call witnesses
43

See, for example, Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen, “Condorcet
Models, Avenues for Future Research,” in Information Pooling and Group Decision Making 93, 94 (Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen eds. 1986). The
theorem requires that each juror make an independent judgment, that each have
a probability greater than .5 that his judgment is correct, and—critically—that
the jury arrives at its outcome by majority vote. Suppose that each member of a
12-person jury has a .6 probability of being correct. Then the jury will reach
the incorrect result only if 7 members are wrong, and the probability of this is
.4 7 , which is only 15 percent. Under a rule of unanimity, the probability of
error would be .4. But, given that juries deliberate, there is no doubt that an
articulate majority is often able to win over dissenters and obtain a unanimous
verdict.
44 For evidence that larger juries increase accuracy and reduce variance, see
Saks, note 7 above, at 14–15, 42–43; Michael J. Saks and Mollie Weighner
Marti, “A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Trial,” 21 Law and Human
Behavior 451 (1997). Some cases are so huge that a single jury, even of 12, is
too small to assure accuracy commensurate with the stakes. This is a problem i n
mass-tort class actions, when claims with aggregate stakes of literally billions of
dollars may be combined for trial before a single jury. The solution is to have a
sample of the cases tried before separate juries. See Michael J. Saks and Peter
David Blanck, “Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation
and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts,” 44 Stanford Law Review 815 (1992);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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(4) Instructing jurors on the law before and during as well as at
the close of trial.
(5) Explaining to jurors the basic rules of evidence so that they
do not draw inappropriate negative inferences from the withholding
of evidence from them. Jurors’ ignorance of the rules of evidence can
lead them to entertain ungrounded suspicions of the honesty of
lawyers and witnesses and to draw erroneous “missing evidence”
inferences.45
(6) Avoiding legal jargon in instructions—a problem so general
that some empirical studies have found “that instructed jurors have
no better grasp of the law than uninstructed jurors”!46
(7) Changing the rules of evidence so as to combat some of the
cognitive quirks that beset decision makers.
(8) Shortening trials as much as possible so that jurors do not
experience information overload.
Accuracy is only one of two factors to be considered in an
economic analysis of evidence; cost is the other. But most of the
suggested reforms are virtually costless and some, like compressing
the trial, might actually reduce costs. The most costly-seeming
reform would be to increase the size of the jury. The larger the jury,
the higher the opportunity costs of taking jurors from their ordinary
pursuits, both because more jurors would be needed and because trials
would be longer, since jury selection would take longer and jury
deliberations would be more protracted. There would also be more
hung juries, and hence more retrials. But the added costs might well
be offset by the fact that more accurate factfinding (which having a
larger jury promotes) should produce better deterrence, resulting, as
45

For analysis and examples, see Bruce A. Green, “‘The Whole Truth?’: How
Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful,” 25 Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review 699 (1992).
46 Saks, note 7 above, at 35; see also Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and John
Payne, “A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages,” 22 Law and Human Behavior 287, 304 (1998). It
may, however, fall into the category of problems that are hopeless but not
serious. The instructions are determined before the lawyers’ closing arguments
to the jury, and the lawyers are not permitted to argue to the jury legal
positions inconsistent with the instructions. In effect, then, the lawyers
instruct the jury, but they do so consistently with the law as laid down by the
judge.
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noted earlier, in less wrongful conduct and so in fewer trials. Also,
the settlement rate will be higher the more predictable the outcome
of the trial is.
I don’t want to go overboard in praise of the large jury. Arbitration, which as a privately created and financed method of adjudication provides a valuable though not infallible benchmark for
evaluating the efficiency of public systems of adjudication, rarely
involves more than three arbitrators and usually there is only one.
The implication is that the costs of a larger panel would exceed the
benefits that I have just been stressing. But the implications for the
efficiency of the large jury are blurred by the fact that cases selected
for arbitration differ systematically from those adjudicated in courts.
Almost all are contract cases in which the parties agreed in the
contract itself to arbitrate disputes arising out of it, and perhaps in
most of them the parties did not anticipate disputes likely to involve
stakes large enough to warrant more than a brief and informal
process of resolution. Although many multimillion dollar contracts
provide for arbitration and rarely if ever do they provide for arbitration by a panel of more than three arbitrators, most contract cases,
even when the stakes are huge, are decided on the basis of the
language of the contract. Messy factual disputes of the sort that a
large panel of factfinders might be better able to resolve are avoided.
The benefits of additional arbitrators may therefore be slight even in
large cases.
Another variable in the design of trial by jury is the voting rule.
Unanimity is the traditional rule, but some states have relaxed it. It is
difficult to say whether this is a good idea, apart from the effect on
the number of cases that hang, which may however be slight if the
unanimity requirement gives way to a lesser supermajority
requirement (for example, conviction or acquittal by a 10–2 vote).47
On the one hand, deliberation is likely to be more perfunctory if
unanimity is not required. On the other hand, unprincipled

47

See Alvin K. Klevorick and Michael Rothschild, “A Model of the Jury
Decision Process,” 8 Journal of Legal Studies 141, 155 (1979); Edward P.
Schwartz and Warren F. Schwartz, “Decisionmaking by Juries under
Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules,” 80 Georgetown Law Journal 775,
787 (1992).
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compromises, which may be necessary to secure unanimity, are also
less likely.
3. A Summary Comparison
Because Americans mistrust officials more than people in most
other countries that are otherwise similar to the United States, an
effective inquisitorial system would cost more here than in the countries in which it is used;48 this may be one reason we haven’t adopted
it. Beyond that, the empirical evidence needed to make a responsible
comparative evaluation of the two types of system is largely
nonexistent. In particular, there is little evidence to support the often
vociferous criticisms of the jury system.49 Opponents of the jury and
proponents of the inquisitorial system can, however, point to two
types of evidence. First, experimental evidence (limited, however, to a
single study) indicates that judges are less subject to hindsight bias
than jurors.50 Second, the conviction rate is lower in bench trials
than in jury trials. The significance of this lies in the fact that in
most states the decision in a criminal case as to whether to be tried
by a judge or by a jury is entirely the defendant’s. If juries are less
accurate guilt determiners than judges, innocent defendants will
choose to be tried by judges rather than run the risk of jury mistake,
while guilty defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for a
mistake; and so the acquittal rate will be higher in bench trials—and
it is.51
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg present some parallel
evidence for civil cases: in products liability and medical malpractice
cases, bench trials strongly favor plaintiffs and jury trials strongly

48

The English legal system may seem a counterexample, since it is an adversary system yet the English population is famously (if diminishingly)
respectful of officials. The appearance is misleading; functionally, the English
legal system is closer to the legal systems of the Continent than to the U.S.
system. See Posner, note 37 above at 20–36.
49 See Lempert, note 7 above.
50 See W. Kip Viscusi, “How Do Judges Think about Risk?” 17–20, 26
(forthcoming in American Law and Economics Review).
51 Gerald D. Gay et al., “Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence,” 20 RAND Journal of Economics 196 (1989).
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favor defendants.52 The plaintiff’s choice of a bench trial, if he has a
strong case, is explicable on the same ground as the criminal
defendant’s choice of bench trial if he has a strong case. The puzzle is
why the civil defendant doesn’t elect jury trial if he has a weak case
and thus needs a mistake by the trier of fact in order to prevail. The
authors think that defendants’ lawyers have bought into popular
misconceptions that juries are inveterately pro-plaintiff. An
alternative possibility is related to the assumed greater accuracy of
judges. To say that juries are less accurate than judges is to say that
there is greater variance around the mean (the correct result, presumably) in jury than in judge decisions. If a defendant has a very weak
case, this greater variance may hurt him. Suppose that the range of
possible damages awards by a judge is $10,000 to $100,000 (for a
mean of $55,000), but for a jury in the same case is $0 to $110,000
(same mean). Then if the defendant has no chance of persuading
the jury to award zero damages, he has more to lose from being tried
by a jury than by a judge. It is because in a civil case the jury determines the size of the sanction, but in a criminal case the judge
does, that jury inaccuracy is likely to work to the disadvantage of the
guilty defendant in the civil case and to his advantage (as noted in
the preceding paragraph) in the criminal case.
I should note that what I am calling “jury inaccuracy” need not
reflect a difference in competence, but could reflect simply a
difference in variance resulting from the fact that there are many
more jurors than there are judges and that they are more diverse
because they lack the uniformity of outlook and experience that
judges tend to have by virtue of common training and vocation. A
defendant who has a weak case will tend to prefer a jury trial when
the jury is asked to make a binary decision (such as guilty or
innocent, liable or not liable), because in such a case variance can
only work to his benefit by reducing the expected punishment.53
Jurors doubtless are somewhat more lawless than judges because
they do not internalize the values of law-following to the same
52

Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, “Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism,” 77 Cornell Law Review 1124, 1162–1166 (1992).
53 Suppose all judges are average, and the average judge will convict this
defendant. The average jury will also convict him, but one in ten juries will
acquit him. Then he is better off choosing a jury trial.
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extent as most judges; this is why we have rules that forbid revealing
to the jury that the defendant in a tort case has liability insurance.
But this point is somewhat to one side of the question of factfinding
competence; more studies are needed before it can be concluded with
any confidence that the American jury is a less accurate factfinder
than the American, or even the European, judge. If it is less accurate, however, it is probably less efficient, at least in civil cases. The
direct cost of jury trials plainly exceeds that of bench trials. Only if a
great deal of value is assigned to John Stuart Mill’s “education in citizenship” rationale for the jury, or to some other political value of jury
trial, are the added costs likely to be offset by greater benefits—except
in criminal cases. Distrust of officials is too great in America for
people to be willing to entrust their liberty solely to professional
judges.
B. Burden of Proof
1. Burden of Production
Burden of proof has two aspects, of which the first is important
only in an adversary system, where the tribunal does not participate
in the search for evidence. This aspect is the burden (duty) of
submitting evidence to the tribunal, as distinct from the burden of
persuading the tribunal that one ought to win the case. The two
burdens are intertwined; for one thing, the burden of persuasion
generally determines who has the burden of production. In the ordinary civil case, the plaintiff’s burden is to show that his position is
more likely than not correct. In other words, if at the end of the trial
the jury either thinks the defendant should win or doesn’t know
which side should win—the evidence seems in equipoise—the
plaintiff loses. This makes a plaintiff who puts in no evidence very
likely to lose; so it makes sense, as a way of economizing on the time
of the tribunal (as well as of reducing nuisance litigation), to require
the plaintiff, as a precondition to getting to trial, to submit evidence
that if believed would be likely to carry the day with the jury before
the defendant is required to submit any evidence.54 This assumes
that the cost to the plaintiff of obtaining this evidence is not
54

See Bruce L. Hay, “Allocating the Burden of Proof,” 72 Indiana Law Journal 651 (1997).
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disproportionately greater than the cost to the defendant of
obtaining contrary evidence (if there is any). But if, as a result of
modern pretrial procedures for discovering evidence in the possession
of the opposing party, the costs of searching for evidence are symmetrical, it makes sense to place the burden of production on the
party that bears the burden of persuasion for the reason first given.
This is the plaintiff in the case of the main claim but the defendant
in the case of affirmative defenses, such as consent, statute of limitations, laches, accord and satisfaction, incapacity, preemption, and res
judicata.
In the case of defenses, moreover, it would be inefficient to
require the plaintiff to anticipate and produce evidence contravening
the indefinite number of defenses that a defendant might plead in a
given case. Such a requirement would also force the plaintiff to do
the defendant’s legal research for him. The plaintiff would have to
identify and counter defenses that the defendant might not have
been aware of as well as some which the defendant might have good
tactical or evidentiary reasons not to plead or that he might not plead
simply because he had one clearly dispositive defense and so didn’t
have to waste his time with others. For example, if the statute of
limitations is a plausible defense in only 5 percent of cases, making
the plaintiff plead and prove that his suit was timely would impose
costs with no corresponding benefits in 95 percent of cases. This
discussion suggests that the nineteenth-century rule that the
plaintiff in a negligence case had to prove his lack of contributory
negligence as well as the defendant’s negligence would have been
sound from an economic standpoint only if either (1) contributory
negligence was a likely defense in the vast majority of such cases, or
(2) because pretrial discovery was very limited, it would have been
much more costly for the defendant than for the plaintiff to
determine whether the plaintiff had been negligent.
The economic rationale of rules governing the burden of
production is further illustrated by the McDonnell Douglas rule.55
Applied mainly in employment discrimination cases, the rule permits
the plaintiff, say in a case of racial discrimination in hiring, to
establish his prima facie case, and thus withstand a motion for
55

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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summary judgment by the defendant, with evidence merely that he
was qualified for the job but was passed over in favor of someone of
another race. But the rule does more: satisfying the just-described
burden of production creates a presumption of discrimination,
meaning that if the defendant puts in no evidence the plaintiff is
entitled to summary judgment. The probability that he lost the job
opportunity because he was discriminated against might seem not to
be very high if the only evidence is as described. But this appraisal
disregards the evidentiary significance of missing evidence. If the defendant, who after all made the decision to give the job to someone
other than the plaintiff, maintains complete silence about the reason
for his action, an inference arises that the reason was indeed discrimination. If the reason was otherwise, he should have been able
without great difficulty to produce some evidence of that.
If the defendant breaks his silence and gives a noninvidious
reason for his action, and the plaintiff is unable to present evidence
casting doubt on that reason, then the plaintiff loses, again without
a trial. If, however, the plaintiff is able to create doubt about the
genuineness of the reason given by the defendant, then the case goes
to the jury and the McDonnell Douglas rule falls out. A jury that
disbelieves the reason given by the defendant can infer that the
plaintiff was indeed discriminated against, but it need not do so;56 it
may conclude that the defendant is embarrassed by the reason that
motivated its action and so is concealing it yet it is not
discriminatory.
The McDonnell Douglas rule is sometimes thought to be motivated by a desire of “liberal” judges to make it easier for the plaintiff
to prevail in a discrimination case. My analysis suggests that the rule
is justifiable in neutral terms of minimizing cost, specifically of
minimizing the cost of trial in cases in which the parties can be
induced to “show their hand” before trial.
2. Burden of Persuasion
In the typical civil trial, there is no basis for supposing that Type
I errors (false positives—such as convicting an innocent person) on
average impose higher costs than Type II errors (false negatives, such
56

See the comprehensive discussion of this issue in Fisher v. Vassar College,
114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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as an erroneous acquittal). So it is enough to justify a verdict for the
plaintiff that the probability that his claim is meritorious exceeds,
however slightly, the probability that it is not. But because the cost
to an innocent defendant of criminal punishment may well exceed
the social benefit of one more conviction of a guilty person (in
maintaining deterrence and preventing the person from committing
crimes for a period of time, namely while he is imprisoned pursuant
to his conviction), Type I errors are more serious than Type II errors
in criminal cases and therefore are weighted more heavily in the
former by the imposition of a heavy burden of persuasion on the
prosecution.57
Here it should be noted parenthetically that trading off Type I
and Type II errors is a pervasive feature of evidence law. Take
disputes over whether a given police lineup is unduly “suggestive.” If
the other persons in the lineup resemble the defendant very closely,
then the chance of a Type I error (mistakenly identifying the
defendant as the criminal) is minimized, because the defendant does
not “stand out.” But the chance of a Type II error (mistakenly
failing to identify the defendant as the criminal) is increased, because
it is easier to confuse the defendant with the other persons in the
lineup.
Another but consistent way to explain the difference between
the criminal and civil burdens is by reference to the inherent advantages of the prosecution in a criminal case, compared to a private
plaintiff, in an adversary system of justice, that is, a system of
competitive evidence search. The government has enormous
prosecutorial resources.58 It can allocate these across cases as it
pleases, extracting guilty pleas by the threat to concentrate its resources against any defendant who refuses to plead and using the
resources thus conserved to wallop the occasional defendant who
does invoke his right to a trial. This is like the situation in which
57
58

Posner, note 1 above, at 408–415.
In cities with a population of a million or more, the average budget of the
local prosecutor’s office exceeds $25 million. Carol J. DeFrances and Greg W .
Steadman, “Prosecutors in State Courts, 1996” 1 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, NCJ 170092, July 1998). Annual appropriations for the
offices of the U.S. Attorneys, which prosecute most federal criminal cases,
aggregate some $1 billion. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1999, Appendix 594 (1998).
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unequal access to capital markets can make predatory pricing a
rational strategy.59 The analogy is closest and the strategy likely to be
most effective when, as is most commonly the case, the defendant
cannot afford to hire counsel but is dependent on court-appointed
counsel who, in other than capital cases, are kept on a short financial
tether. Even the rare defendant who can afford to hire counsel will
normally be unable to match the resources that the government can
credibly threaten to pour into the case. The burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is a partial offset (like the provision of
counsel to indigent defendants) to the inequality of the parties’
resources for gathering and presenting evidence. In an inquisitorial
system, where the search is conducted by a presumably disinterested
judge, the need for a heavier burden of proof in a criminal than in a
civil system is attenuated.
A complicating factor is that prosecutors may be disinterested
too, since, unlike private lawyers, their incomes are not tied directly
to success in litigation. But economic theory, as well as common
sense and observation, suggests that the desire to win, weighted by
the stakes in the case (roughly, the sentence if the defendant is
convicted), is the most important argument in the prosecutorial
utility function, and thus that prosecutors have incentives similar to
those of private lawyers. Being a prosecutor is rarely a terminal job; it
is a stepping stone. Future employers will evaluate a prosecutor by his
success in litigation, which will be seen as a function of his win rate
weighted by the opposition that he had to overcome in order to win,
and that will usually be greater the graver the offense charged.
Judges when asked to express proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
a probability of guilt generally pick a number between .75 to .95
(depending on the judge), and jury quantifications are similar.60
These may seem shockingly low figures, implying that as many as a
quarter of the people convicted of crime are innocent. Not so. The
higher the crime rate in relation to prosecutorial resources, the more
59

See, for example, Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C.
Picker, Game Theory and the Law 183–184 (1994).
60 See National Research Council, The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as
Evidence in the Courts 201–204 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed. 1989); Joseph L.
Gastwirth, Statistical Reasoning in Law and Public, vol. 2: Tort Law, Evidence,
and Health 700–702 (1988).
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thoroughly prosecutors will screen cases for easy ones to win, and
these will tend to be drawn from the tail of the distribution of
suspects that contains the suspects who are most likely to be guilty in
fact. The heavy burden of persuasion and the other procedural
advantages of criminal defendants increase the incentive of
prosecutors to go after the guiltiest by making it difficult to convict a
defendant, notwithstanding the disparity in resources between the
prosecuting authorities and all but the wealthiest defendants, unless
the case is one sided against him. If because of prosecutorial
screening only 1 percent of the persons prosecuted are innocent,
then even if all are convicted, only 1 percent of convicted persons
will be innocent. And even that is an exaggeration. Not all persons
who are prosecuted are convicted, and it is normally much easier for
an innocent than for a guilty defendant to create enough doubt of
guilt in the trier of fact to induce an acquittal.
Tight screening implies that some, perhaps many, guilty people
are not prosecuted and that most people who are prosecuted and
acquitted are actually guilty. In the previous example, if a 10 percent
acquittal rate is assumed, then 99 percent of the defendants acquitted
would actually have been guilty if the probability of acquittal was
random with respect to innocence and 90 percent if all innocent defendants were acquitted.61 This implies that when crime rates rise
faster than prosecutorial resources, entailing an even finer mesh in
the screening of cases to pursue, the procedural advantages of defendants should be reduced by courts or legislatures if society wants
to maintain the same balance between the probabilities of convicting
the innocent and of acquitting the guilty. This point suggests a
possible nonideological basis for the Supreme Court’s swing against
the rights of criminal defendants in the 1970s and 1980s. Had those
rights been preserved intact, the rise in crime rates in that era (which
61

Of 10,000 defendants, 100 (1 percent) are assumed to be innocent. If 1,000
are acquitted (10 percent) and the probability of acquittal is the same regardless
of innocence, then in that group of 1,000 1 percent are innocent and therefore
99 percent guilty. If all 1,000 innocents are acquitted, then 9,000 of the
acquitted defendants must be guilty (90 percent). “Juries are not particularly
good at evaluating eyewitness testimony…If they return few erroneous
convictions it is because they are given few opportunities to judge innocent
defendants.” Samuel R. Gross, “Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification
and Proof of Guilt,” 16 Journal of Legal Studies 395, 432 (1987).
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greatly exceeded the increase in the number of prosecutions62) would
have had the paradoxical effect of making it easier for guilty defendants to avoid punishment. That in turn would have reduced the
expected cost of punishment, and so driven crime rates even higher,
unless there was an offsetting increase in the severity of punishment
for those (fewer) criminals who were caught and convicted.
The assumption in the preceding paragraph of crime rates rising
faster than prosecutorial resources suggests an alternative response to
rising crime rates to curtailing defendants’ procedural rights:
increasing prosecutorial budgets. Courts could exert pressure on
legislatures to do this by holding the line on procedure and
invalidating (as cruel and unusual) steep legislative increases in the
severity of criminal punishments. Legislatures would be forced to
choose between increasing prosecutorial budgets and higher crime
rates that would place additional pressure on the courts to relax
procedural safeguards. The courts chose not to play this game of
chicken with federal and state legislators.
Although the burden of persuasion is much lower in a civil case
and most plaintiffs do not operate with a resource constraint (thanks
to contingent fees), there is no reason to suppose that a higher
fraction of civil than of criminal cases are decided incorrectly. Burden
of persuasion has less to do with the number of errors than with the
distribution of errors between sides. More undeserving plaintiffs
than undeserving prosecutors win, but fewer undeserving civil
defendants than undeserving criminal defendants win. What makes
it likely that most cases, civil or criminal, are resolved correctly is
simply that it is usually cheaper to obtain persuasive evidence on the
side of truth. But a selection effect makes the overall accuracy of the
system difficult to observe. The procedural system as a whole is more
accurate than the trial component of it, but it is the latter that is
visible. One-sided cases are more likely to be settled before trial,
62

Between 1960 and 1996, the “crime index” compiled by the FBI and reported in the FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports grew almost sevenfold.
During the same period federal criminal prosecutions grew by a third (see
annual reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts). For state criminal prosecutions, there are data only from 1977. Between then and 1994, the number of prosecutions actually declined slightly (as
estimated by the Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State
Courts), a period during which the crime index was growing by a third.
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usually with little publicity, than toss-ups are,63 and so the latter are
overrepresented on the trial docket, which is highly visible. This is a
reason why a criminal justice system that disfavors plea bargaining
(like the German) is bound to appear more accurate than our system.
The more that plea bargaining is discouraged, the more one-sided
cases there are in the trial mix.
3. Statistical Evidence
a. The bus case.64 It is now generally recognized, even by the
judiciary, that since all evidence is probabilistic—there are no
metaphysical certainties—evidence should not be excluded merely
because its accuracy can be expressed in explicitly probabilistic terms,
as in the case of fingerprint and DNA evidence.65 But courts are
reluctant to take the next step and hold that, given the modest burden of persuasion in civil cases, the explicit probability that the
plaintiff’s essential evidence is true need only exceed 50 percent,
however slightly. Suppose that the plaintiff is hit by a bus, and it is
known that 51 percent of the buses on the road where the plaintiff
was hit are owned by Bus Company A and 49 percent by Company
B. The plaintiff sues A and asks for judgment on the basis of this
statistic alone; he tenders no other evidence. If the defendant also
puts in no evidence, should a jury be allowed to award judgment for
the plaintiff? The law’s answer is “no,”66 and has so much intuitive
63

See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation,” 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984).
64 For the most thorough discussion of this famous chestnut of modern evidence scholarship, see Gary L. Wells, “Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability:
Is Subjective Probability Enough?” 62 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
739 (1992).
65 See, for example, United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 893 n. 3 (3d
Cir. 1994).
66 See Richard W. Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability,
Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the
Concepts,” 73 Iowa Law Review 1001, 1050–1051 (1988), and cases cited. The
hypothetical case in the text is a variant of Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58
N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945), where the court held that it “was not enough” “that
perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition that a bus of
the defendant caused the accident.” Id. at 755. Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp., 288
N.W.2d 426 (Mich. App. 1979), is sometimes cited as being contrary to Smith,
but this is not an accurate reading. Quite apart from the fact that the
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appeal as to make the example Exhibit A in the case against using
Bayes’ theorem, or mathematical probability generally (or perhaps
any theory of probability), to guide or interpret legal factfinding.
The answer might, moreover, seem to cast a cloud over the admissibility of any explicitly probabilistic evidence. We can think of the
civil burden of persuasion as requiring posterior odds of a shade over
1 in favor of the plaintiff (say 1.048, which is 51/49), because a tie
goes to the defendant. If the prior odds are assumed to be 1 to 1, on
the theory that the jury begins hearing the evidence—in our
hypothetical case it is the evidence, which is the only evidence they
do hear, concerning the percentage of buses of each company on the
route in question—without any notion of who has the better case,
then the posterior odds are equal to the likelihood ratio. This is
1.048, and since it exceeds 1 the plaintiff should win—which almost
no legal professional believes.
The problem that causes this disbelief, however, is not with
mathematical probability but with the tacit assumption that the
statistic concerning the ownership of the buses is the only evidence
that the plaintiff can obtain.67 It is the implausibility of this
assumption that powers the intuition that the plaintiff should lose.
If the statistic is the plaintiff’s only evidence, the inference to be
drawn is not that there is a 51 percent probability that it was a bus
owned by A that hit the plaintiff but that the plaintiff either investigated and discovered that it was actually a bus owned by B (and let
us say that B is judgment-proof and so not worth suing), or that he
has simply not bothered to conduct an investigation. If the first
alternative is true, he should of course lose; and since it may be true,
the probability that the plaintiff was hit by a bus owned by A is
significantly less than 51 percent and the plaintiff has failed to carry
his burden of production.
corresponding percentages were 90 percent and 10 percent; there was also
nonstatistical evidence pointing to the defendant’s ownership of the truck that
had caused the accident. My discussion of the bus hypothetical draws in part on
my opinion in Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-1781 (7th Cir. Nov. 3,
1998).
67 Another problem, which however I shall ignore (though it is relevant i n
showing the artificiality of the example), is that the plaintiff must prove more
than the ownership of the bus to obtain a judgment—notably, he must prove
that the accident was due to the bus company’s negligence.
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Even if the second alternative is true (the plaintiff simply didn’t
bother to investigate), he should lose. A court should not expend any
of its scarce resources of time and effort on a case until the plaintiff
has conducted a sufficient search to indicate that an expenditure of
public resources is reasonably likely to yield a significant social
benefit. That is implicit in the decision discussed earlier to place the
burden of producing evidence on the plaintiff rather than on the
defendant. Suppose it would cost the court system $10,000 to try
even a barebones case. This expenditure would be worthless from the
standpoint of deterring accidents should it turn out that the bus was
owned by B. It makes sense for the court to require some advance
investigation by the plaintiff in order to increase the probability that
a commitment of judicial resources would be worthwhile. And
likewise if there is an external benefit to “getting right” which bus
company is responsible for the plaintiff’s injury: the law can increase
the probability of getting it right by compelling the plaintiff to do a
more thorough investigation than it might be in his strictly private
interest to do.
If, however, the ratio of buses owned by A to those owned by B
on the route in question is much higher than 51/49, then the case
against allowing “naked” statistical evidence to carry the plaintiff’s
burden of production is weakened. Even in the 51/49 case, if there is
other evidence against A there is an argument for admitting the statistical evidence because the additional evidence, even if weak, will
(and rightly, under Bayes’ theorem) affect the factfinder’s posterior
odds.68 But as we shall see when we discuss Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the probative value of the evidence may be too
slight in relation to its cost to be worth admitting.
Suppose both parties do conduct a thorough investigation yet
are unable to come up with any additional evidence bearing on the
ownership of the bus. There is no longer a basis for suspicion that
the plaintiff really believes that a bus owned by Company B hit him,
or for punishing him for not having investigated more. The case
may seem no different from any other one tried under the
preponderance of the evidence standard in which the balance of
68

See Steven C. Salop, “Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas
Bayes: A Note for Teachers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1987, p.
155.
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probabilities tilts only slightly in favor of the plaintiff. But there is a
difference. Suppose the legal system can identify an entire class of
cases in which the balance of probabilities tilts as slightly in favor of
the plaintiff as it does in the bus case. If there are 1,000 such cases,
then allowing them to be tried can be expected to yield 510 correct
decisions (that is, 510 decisions in which the defendant was in fact
the injurer) and 490 incorrect ones, while not allowing them to be
tried can be expected to yield 490 correct decisions and 510 erroneous
ones. The social benefits of the 20 additional correct decisions that
allowing the 1,000 cases to be tried would produce—benefits in
more perfect deterrence of negligent accidents—would probably fall
short of the social cost of 1,000 trials.
b. Statistical significance. Suspicion of purely statistical evidence
is merited in the hypothetical bus case. It is also but less justifiably
reflected in suggestions that the result of a statistical investigation
should be given no weight in a trial unless the result is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level,69 meaning that the probability that
the investigation would have yielded this result even if the hypothesis
that it was trying to test was false is no greater than 5 percent. The 5
percent test is a convention employed in academic research, though
not one to which the research community adheres rigidly. Social
scientists often report results that are significant only at the 10
percent level, while if the results are significant at the 2 percent or 1
percent level the social scientist will point out that these results are
more robust than those that are significant only at the 5 percent
69

This is a common interpretation of Hazelwood School District v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n. 17 (1977), and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 496 n. 17 (1977), as noted without endorsement in Thomas R. Ireland et
al., Expert Economic Testimony: Reference Guides for Judges and Attorneys 237
(1998). See also Alpo Petfoods Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 962
n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Ottaviani v. State University of New York, 875 F.2d
365, 372 (2d Cir. 1989); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 684 (6th Cir. 1988).
But the interpretation is incorrect, as noted in Orley Ashenfelter and Ronald
Oaxaca, “The Economics of Discrimination: Economists Enter the
Courtroom” 77 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 321, 323
(May 1987). For criticism of using significance levels as criteria of admissibility, see Richard Lempert, “Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld,” 85 Columbia Law Review 1098, 1099–1103 (1985). And see generally
David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, vol. 1, pp. 118–121 (1997).
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level; they are “highly significant” rather than just “significant.” So
there is no magic to the 5 percent criterion; and to exclude from a
trial statistical evidence that failed to reach the 5 percent significance
level would imply that eyewitness testimony, too, should be inadmissible unless the probability that the testimony would have been given
even if the event testified to had not occurred was less than 5
percent.
What is true is that the higher the significance level of a statistical study, the more reliable the study is as evidence; and the lower
that level, the less reliable it is. A low significance level may reflect an
unsound method of statistical estimation, an incorrect specification
of the hypothesis being tested, or the omission of relevant variables
that if included would have caused the hypothesis to be rejected.
When any of these factors is present, the same kind of suspicion will
arise as in the bus case. But if the study has been conducted
responsibly and has withstood a hammering from the opponent’s
expert, yet the significance level does not reach the conventional 5
percent level, it would not be a good reason for excluding the evidence that a social scientist who violates the conventions of his discipline by reporting results that do not attain the conventional
significance level must be untrustworthy. The convention is rooted
in considerations that have no direct relevance to litigation, such as
the need to ration pages in scientific journals.70 And fears that jurors
are dazzled by evidence which involves explicit probability estimates,
and so give such evidence more weight than a good Bayesian would
do, appear to be unfounded; jurors appear to give such evidence less
weight that they should.71
70

A similar point is made in an emerging economic literature on clinical trials
and other social experiments: benefits from adherence to statistical conventions
(randomization, sample size, significance, and so on) must be traded off against
costs. See, for example, Tomas Philipson, “The Evaluation of New Health
Care Technology: The Labor Economics of Statistics,” 76 Journal of
Econometrics 375 (1997).
71 See Brian C. Smith et al., “Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence,” 20 Law
and Human Behavior 49 (1996). Wells, note 64 above, attributes this to a cognitive quirk and suggests that it might be offset by a redescription of statistical
evidence. See id. at 748–750. He states with reference to a paternity suit i n
which blood tests showed a 99.8 percent probability that the defendant was
indeed the father that “one suspects that the plaintiff would have won the suit if
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But we must not overlook the cost of weak statistical evidence.
The less robust the results of a statistical study offered as evidence,
the more time will have to be spent at trial exploring the design of
the study. Given the difficulty that judges and jurors have in
understanding and weighing statistical evidence, there is an
argument (akin to that for the hearsay rule) for excluding statistical
evidence that the relevant profession, for whatever reason, considers
weak.
4. The Product Rule
Another feature of the mathematical theory of probability that
has drawn fire from evidence professors is also connected to the
burden of persuasion. This is the rule that the probability that two
(or more) independent events is true is the product of the probabilities that each of them is true. For example, the probability of coming
up with heads on three consecutive fair tosses is .125 (.5 x .5 x .5).
This leads to the paradox emphasized by Ronald Allen that the
standard burden of proof instructions to a jury in a civil case, at least
if taken literally, will often imply that the jury should find in favor of
the plaintiff even if the probability that his claim is valid is much less
than .5.72 For the jury will be instructed to render a verdict for the
plaintiff if it is satisfied that he has proved each of the elements of
his claim by a preponderance of the evidence even if the elements are
independent, that is, their probabilities are uncorrelated. It’s as if the
jury were being told that as soon as it finds one element proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, it should assume that that element
has been proved to a certainty. In other words, the jurors are being
told to be bad mathematicians! In the simple case in which the
plaintiff, to prove his case (C), must prove just two elements (A and
B), and the burden of persuasion is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the elements are both independent and equiprobable,
so that p(C) = p(A) x p(B) and p(A) = p(B), then for the plaintiff
the expert had reframed his testimony to say that ‘based on a blood test that is
99.8% accurate, I conclude that the defendant is the father’ rather than ‘based
on a blood test, there is a 99.8% probability that the defendant is the father.’”
Id. at 749.
72 See Ronald J. Allen, “A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials,” 66 Boston
University Law Review 401 (1986), and “The Nature of Juridical Proof,” 13
Cardozo Law Review 373, 409–420 (1991).
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actually to carry his burden of persuasion (p(C) > .5) the jury would
have to find p(A) = p(B) > .707, that is, that the probability of each
element exceeds .707, not, as it will be instructed, .5.
But perhaps the real function of the instruction is different: to
indicate to the jury that a chain of inferences cannot be stronger
than its weakest link. Even if the plaintiff has proved the defendant’s negligence to a certainty, if the probability that the defendant’s negligence caused the injury of which the plaintiff is
complaining is .5 or less the plaintiff should still lose, since causation
is an essential element of the negligence tort. As in this example,
moreover, the number of elements of the plaintiff’s claim is, except
for purely formal requirements, rarely more than two, and the two
are rarely independent.
Most important, as Allen points out, the realistic benchmark for
evaluating the plaintiff’s case is not the null hypothesis but the
defendant’s case. Suppose, in a case in which the plaintiff’s case has
two elements—that a person hit him and that the person was the
defendant’s employee, elements which are independent of each
other—the jury reckons the probability of the first element at .6 and
of the second at .7, for a joint probability of .42. This still leaves the
question: What did happen? Did the plaintiff fabricate his claim?
Was he injured, but by someone else? If the injurer was not the
defendant’s employee, what was his status? Mulling over these
questions, the jury may rationally conclude that the plaintiff’s story,
even though it has doubtful features, is more plausible than the alternative story told by the defendant, and therefore that the plaintiff
should win. This was Hume’s argument against miracles.73 No
doubt it was unlikely that the laws of nature could explain the
phenomena attested as miraculous. But it was even less likely that
the laws of nature had been suspended in these cases; to put it differently, it was more likely that the witnesses of the alleged miracles
were lying or mistaken; thus, as we might put it, the naturalists had
proved their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Notice,
73

David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding § 10, pt. 1
(1748). William Kruskal, “Miracles and Statistics: The Casual Assumption of
Independence,” 83 Journal of the American Statistical Association 929 (1988), emphasizes the importance to a proper evaluation of Hume’s thesis of whether the
testimony of the various witnesses to miracles was independent.
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however, that in Hume’s case there were only two possibilities:
either the alleged miracles were miracles, or they were not. In a legal
case, the plaintiff might tell one story (the story that if true shows
that he should win the case), the defendant might tell another, less
probable story, and yet there might also be additional possible stories.
If the plaintiff’s story had a probability of .42 of being true, the
defendant’s story a probability of .30 of being true, and the
probability that another story or stories is true was .28, then the
plaintiff should lose because he has failed to prove that his story is
more likely than not true.
But nothing in the mathematical theory of probability forbids
working backwards from a joint probability to individual probabilities. After considering all alternatives, the jury might be quite
confident that it was an employee of the defendant who hit the
plaintiff. Suppose the jury reckoned that joint probability at .7. If
one pointed out to the members of the jury that they couldn’t have
come to this conclusion consistently with reckoning the individual
probabilities at .7 and .6, they would quickly be led to recalculate
those probabilities. They would say something like, “Until we
considered the case as a whole we didn’t realize how much more
likely than not it was that the plaintiff was indeed hit and that the
person who hit him was indeed the defendant’s employee.”
This discussion bears also on the criticism that Bayes’ theorem
does not take account of the fact that the weight and completeness
of the evidence bearing on a hypothesis, and not just the odds that
we might give on its correctness if we are betting folk, are important
to people’s judgments.74 In fact, weak evidence and missing evidence
do affect the odds that a person would be willing to give that some
hypothesis was correct. In the bus case, for example, it would be
reckless to give odds of 51 to 49 that the plaintiff was hit by a bus
owned by Company A if there were no other evidence beyond the
bare statistic. For the failure of the plaintiff to come up with any
other evidence would give rise to an inference that it was actually B’s
bus that struck the plaintiff, that the plaintiff knows this, and that
74

The philosopher L. Jonathan Cohen has made this criticism a number of
times. See, for example, his article “The Role of Evidential Weight i n
Criminal Proof,” in Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses
and Limits of Bayesianism, note 7 above, at 113.
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he has sued A only because B is judgment-proof. And here it should
be mentioned that one doesn’t have to be a gambler to think in
terms of odds. A nongambler facing a decision whether to undergo
an operation will be interested in the odds of the operation’s being
successful. Or maybe this example shows that we’re all gamblers in a
sense.
5. The Biased Factfinder and the Peremptory Challenge
The significance of Bayes’ theorem for thinking about the law
of evidence is mainly as a reminder that estimating probability is a
useful and rational way of dealing with uncertainty, that one should
update one’s estimates as new information flows in, and that the
impact of new information on one’s ultimate conclusion depends on
one’s priors, that is, on the probability that one estimated before
beginning to consider evidence. The last point suggests a possible
way of thinking about “bias” as a ground for excusing a prospective
juror or recusing a judge. Ideally we want the trier of fact to work
from prior odds of 1 to 1 that the plaintiff or prosecutor has a meritorious case. A substantial departure from this position, in either direction, marks the trier of fact as biased, with the bad effects that I
discussed earlier in reference to the judge who has strong priors in a
system in which judges rather than juries are the decision makers.
Although the clearest case of bias is where the judge or jury not only
has a prior belief about the proper outcome of the case but holds the
belief unshakably—that is, refuses to update it on the basis of
evidence—it is not a complete response to a charge of bias that the
judge or juror has an “open mind” in the sense of being willing to
adjust his probability estimate in the light of the evidence presented
at the trial. Any rational person will do that. (What I just called the
“clearest case” of bias is thus a case of irrational bias.) His prior odds,
if he is a Bayesian, will still have an influence on his posterior odds
and hence (at least in a close case—an important qualification for
reasons explained earlier) on his decision.
This discussion implies that inquisitorial systems will be less
concerned with bias than adversarial ones. If the judge dominates
the search for evidence, the problem that his strong (albeit accurate)
priors would discourage search by the lawyers and so eventually make
his priors less accurate by reducing the flow of relevant information
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to him is less serious, because the role of the lawyers in the search
process is smaller.
But in evaluating bias one must distinguish between prior beliefs
about the proper outcome of the case and those prior beliefs that
judges and jurors inevitably and rightly bring to the factfinding
process—priors that constitute “common sense,” such as the belief
that witnesses are likely to shade evidence to make themselves look
good. The ideal factfinder is not a tabula rasa; he simply reserves
judgment on whether the plaintiff or defendant in this particular
case should win. But even if impartiality thus means only lacking a
prior belief (that is, prior to hearing evidence in the case) about the
outcome of the case, it still has a downside: ignorance and inexperience. The problem is particularly serious in the case of trial by jury.
The strength of the jury system, constituting at least a partial offset
to jurors’ lack of expertise in adjudication, is its pooling of persons of
diverse experience and perspective. When lawyers for both sides are
free (as they are) to use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors who
seem predisposed in favor of the opposing party, the epistemic
diversity of the jury is impaired.75 Deliberation might be fostered if
the system, instead of striving to have jurors whose prior odds in
favor of the plaintiff are 1, created balanced panels of jurors having
equal but opposite odds in favor of (and against) the plaintiff. But
this seems infeasible. Alternatives include reducing the number of
peremptory challenges and increasing the size of the jury.
C. Judge versus Jury; or, What Is a Fact?
A judge, whether the trial judge or an appellate judge, obviously
has a comparative advantage over a jury when it comes to deciding
questions of law. But the line between a question of fact and a
question of law is not always clear. Negligence is a legal concept; but
is the question whether the defendant was negligent a legal or a
factual question? The answer usually given is that it is both or
neither and is perhaps best described as a “mixed” question of law and
fact or a question about the application of a legal concept to a set of
facts. I believe, on the contrary, that it is a pure question of fact, and
75

Edward P. Schwartz and Warren F. Schwartz, “The Challenge of
Peremptory Challenges,” 12 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 325
(1996).
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so the law is right to leave it to the jury subject to the same
deferential review as other factual determinations that juries make.
This is most easily seen when the concept of negligence is expressed
in the terms of the Hand formula.76 That is, the defendant is negligent if B < PL, which is to say if the burden (cost) of avoiding the
accident was less than the cost of the accident (L for loss) discounted
(multiplied) by the probability that the accident would have occurred
had the burden of avoidance been shouldered. Each determination
required to apply the formula is factual rather than legal in character:
estimating B, P, and L, multiplying P and L, and determining
whether PL is larger than B. No legal knowledge is required to
make any of these determinations (as would be the case if the jury
were asked to decide what negligence is), which when made answer
the question whether the defendant was negligent. I believe, but
will not try to demonstrate here, that most other “mixed” questions
of law and fact, such as possession, voluntariness, and good faith,
could similarly be decomposed into pure questions of fact.
III. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by Congress in 1975
and amended from time to time since (most recently in 1998),
together with the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence, constitute a compendious as well as authoritative guide to
the modern law of evidence. I shall use these rules77 as the skeleton
of my further discussion of evidence law, skipping however a number
of the less important or less problematic provisions. For example,
Rule 201, involving judicial notice of incontestable facts (that is, no
76

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L.
Hand, J.); Landes and Posner, note 14 above, at 85–88.
77 They are published, together with the Advisory Committee Notes and
excerpts from the congressional history, as “Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates,” in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules
340 (West Group, 1998). The rules apply to criminal as well as civil cases, and
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evidence is required to prove the obvious), is important, but it is
obviously sound as a matter of economics as well as common sense:
evidence of what is obvious would involve some cost and yield no
benefit. Rule 301, dealing with presumptions, is important and
nonobvious, but need not be discussed here in view of my earlier
discussion of the McDonnell-Douglas rule.
Besides these omissions from the present discussion, it is
important to note that the formal rules of evidence codify only a
fraction of the law of evidence. Some of the most important rules of
evidence, being limited to particular fields of substantive law, are
classified as parts of their substantive fields rather than as parts of the
law of evidence. Examples from tort law are the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the awarding of damages for loss of a chance (eliding
intractable issues of proof), and (to the same end) rules allocating
liability among negligent defendants when the causal contribution
of each cannot be determined. Examples from contract law are the
parol evidence and “four corners” rules and the statute of frauds, all
designed to reduce the number of intractable credibility issues in
trials for breach of contract. Likewise affecting the evidentiary
process are the laws punishing perjury, which are classified with
criminal law rather than evidence law, and statutes of limitations,
which reduce the likelihood that questions concerning events in the
distant past will have to be answered at trial. Of particular importance in criminal trials today, the federal sentencing guidelines direct
the sentencing judge, in cases in which the defendant testifies, to
impose additional punishment (for obstruction of justice) if the
judge determines that the defendant perjured himself.
The evidentiary rules embedded in tort and contract law, the
imposition of criminal sanctions for perjury and obstruction of
justice, and statutes of limitations show, incidentally, that the law is
not entirely naive about the ability of judges and juries to resolve
credibility issues. In most cases, as the law recognizes, there are no
completely reliable methods of determining whether a witness is testifying truthfully. A witness may be a good actor, in the sense of a
person able to create the appearance of honesty, or a good liar, in the
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sense of a person able to weave a plausible and internally consistent
fiction, or both. Judges and juries are easily fooled by good liars.78
A. Harmless Error
Rule 103(a) provides (among other things) that a ruling admitting or excluding evidence cannot be made the basis of a motion
for a new trial or of reversal on appeal “unless a substantial right of
the party [against whom the ruling went] is affected.” In other
words, harmless errors will be overlooked. The harmless error
doctrine is not limited to evidentiary rulings, but, partly because such
rulings are so frequent in a trial, they are common candidates for
harmless error treatment. More important, judgments of
harmlessness depend on assumptions about the understanding of the
trier of fact.
Harmless error plays a particularly important role in criminal
appeals, and they will be the focus of my discussion. Because most
criminal defendants do not pay for their lawyer, they will appeal
their conviction or sentence even if the probability of reversal is
slight; although the expected benefits of appealing may be slight, the
expected costs are zero. Minor errors therefore figure prominently in
criminal appeals, and this makes clear the need for a doctrine of
harmless error to head off remands that would be all costs and no
benefits. But despite the common-sense (and economic) appeal of
the harmless error principle, it may often confer an undeserved, or at
least unintended, advantage on prosecutors.79 The rule is biased in
their favor because the appellate court, not having witnessed the trial
(and, especially, not having observed the jury), lacks good information for assessing the likelihood that the errors affected the
outcome. The appellate court perforce assesses the likely effect of the
errors on the average jury, whereas the prosecutor may know that
the particular jury before which he is prosecuting the defendant has
an above-average propensity to acquit, with the result that he may
78

Michael J. Saks, “Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication,”
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79 For a more complete treatment, see William M. Landes and Richard A .
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have to manipulate the jury’s emotions if he is to secure a conviction.
And so an error may look harmless to the appellate court yet have
been harmful. Moreover, it takes a highly disciplined judge to vote to
reverse a conviction when he thinks the defendant is guilty, even if
he acknowledges to himself that the defendant might have been
acquitted but for an error at trial and so is entitled by law to a new
trial.
The foregoing analysis can be formalized as follows. Let p be
the probability of conviction; a the probability of affirmance given
conviction (the prosecutor is assumed to be unable to appeal, and the
defendant is assumed to appeal in every case in which there is a
conviction), so that 1 – a is the probability of reversal; b the benefit
to the prosecutor or prosecution-minded judge of a conviction; c the
cost of a trial to the prosecutor (for simplicity, assume that the cost
to him of defending an appeal by the defendant is zero—it will in
fact usually be quite low relative to the cost of trial); x the set of
tactics that involve violating procedural and evidentiary rules that
favor the defense;80 and y the other inputs into getting a conviction.
Increases in x and y increase p, the probability of conviction;
increases in x also decrease a, the probability that a conviction will be
affirmed; increases in y also increase c.
If the prosecutor employs x tactics, there are three possible states
of the world: conviction followed by affirmance; conviction followed
by reversal followed by a retrial at which, we can assume, the
variables are as they would have been in the first trial if x = 0; and
acquittal, which generates no gain to the prosecutor and leaves him
with a net loss measured by c. The prosecutor’s net expected gain
(G) when he employs x is therefore the sum of his gain if there is an
affirmed conviction (p(x,y)b – c(x,y)), his gain if there is a reversed
conviction followed by a retrial (p(x,y)(p(y)b – c(y)), and his gain if
there is acquittal (0 – c(x,y)), with the first gain being discounted by
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Perhaps the most common such tactic is inviting (without actually asking—that would be reversible error) the jury to infer the defendant’s guilt from
his failure to take the stand. Notice that this “abuse” is an artifact of the
existence of the privilege against being forced to incriminate oneself—a
privilege that, as we shall see, is not easy to justify on economic or other
grounds.
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the probability of affirmance (a) and the second by the probability of
reversal (1 – a). Thus,
(6)

G = a(x)p(x,y)b – c(x,y) + p(x,y)(1 – a(x))(p(y)b – c(y)) –
c(x,y)

(The reason that p and c in the reversal-retrial state of the world are
not shown as functions of x is that by assumption x = 0 in that
state.)
The effect of x (abusive tactics) on G is complex. On the one
hand, it raises G by increasing the probability of a conviction, but
lowers it by increasing the probability of a reversal of the conviction
and by increasing the prosecutor’s costs. The possibility that the net
effect is to increase G cannot be excluded. The possibility is increased
if we consider the substitutability of x for y (of violating procedural or
evidentiary rules for other inputs into obtaining a conviction). For
then the effect of using abusive tactics, while it includes as before
reducing the probability of a conviction that will stick and thus
increasing the likelihood of having to incur the cost of a second trial
(c(y)), is also to reduce the cost of the first trial. This is an additional
reason to believe that if the effect of the abusive tactics in reducing
the probability that the defendant’s conviction will be affirmed is
low because of the harmless error rule, the rule encourages deliberate
error by the prosecution. It is especially likely to do so if the
substitution effect of x on y is large, that is, if the abusive tactics are a
cheap and effective substitute for legitimate forensic tactics.
Even if the doctrine of harmless error thus invites prosecutors to
commit deliberate errors, this might be efficient if prosecutors only
committed such errors when faced with a jury irrationally prone to
acquit. That might indeed be the consequence of the doctrine if
appellate courts were omniscient. For then they could forgive
prosecutorial errors if but only if the defendant was in fact guilty. If,
however, the appellate court cannot tell whether the defendant is
guilty, if all it knows is whether an average jury would have
convicted the defendant had it not been for the errors, then the
prosecutor may have an incentive to use deliberate errors to convict
the innocent. How great an incentive, one does not know; it
depends on the weight of purely careerist ambitions in prosecutorial
utility functions. To be on the safe side, one might wish to modify
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the doctrine of harmless error to exclude from its operation deliberate
errors committed or induced by prosecutors and make these cause for
automatic reversal.
B. Limiting Instructions
Federal Rule of Evidence 105 directs the judge to instruct the
jury to limit its consideration of evidence admissible for one purpose
(or against one party) but not for another. The assumption is that
although the jury heard the inadmissible evidence, it is capable of
disregarding it if instructed to do so. The assumption is not always
indulged. For example, if the admissibility of a confession is in issue,
the issue must be heard outside of the jury’s hearing (Rule 104(c)),
since if the confession were to be ruled inadmissible the jurors could
not be expected to put it out of their minds in deciding whether the
defendant was guilty. But in general, limiting instructions are
deemed efficacious, not only in the circumstances with which Rule
105 deals but also when used to “cure” the erroneous or inadvertent
admission of inadmissible evidence: the judge tells the jury to
disregard it.
Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests that courts
greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting instructions.81 A limiting
instruction is very likely to be completely ineffectual unless the judge
is able to explain why, as with certain types of hearsay, the evidence
isn’t probative. If it is probative (or emotionally compelling82),
though inadmissible, the limiting instruction seems more likely to
rivet the jurors’ attention to the evidence than to get them to
disregard it even if the judge explains the basis for the instruction.83
For this reason, lawyers will often not request a limiting instruction
though entitled to it. And notice how in a criminal trial the deemed
81
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See Saks, note 7 above, at 26, and studies cited there.
The standard example is a gruesome photograph of a murder victim. On the
capacity of such photographs to prejudice the jury’s consideration of the
logically distinct issue of guilt, see Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyons, and
James R. P. Ogloff, “The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock
Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?” 21 Law and
Human Behavior 485 (1997).
83 For evidence, see Kerri L. Pickel, “Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help,” 19 Law and Human
Behavior 407, 422–423 (1995).
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but doubtful efficacy of limiting instructions cooperates with the
doctrine of harmless error in encouraging prosecutors to resort to
abusive tactics if they fear that acquittal is likely otherwise. For the
likeliest response to an improper question or comment is neither a
mistrial nor a reversal, but an impotent limiting instruction.
There is, it is true, a difference between belief and acceptance.
Belief is involuntary, so telling someone not to believe something
without giving him a reason to think that it is not credible is
ineffective to alter the person’s beliefs; that is the basis of skepticism
about limiting instructions. But antiskeptics might point out that
one can refuse to act on a belief. You might believe the defendant
guilty yet accept that he should be acquitted because you don’t believe
it with the requisite degree of certitude.84 In other words, burden of
persuasion is properly regarded as involving acceptance rather than
belief. The prior odds, the posterior odds, the likelihood ratios
created by particular pieces of evidence are all matters of belief; but
what posterior odds shall give the victory to plaintiff or defendant is
a matter of acceptance. And this is a distinction that jurors should be
able to understand.
The problem with using this insight to rehabilitate the limiting
instruction is that when a jury is deliberating, it is very difficult for it
to disregard the inadmissible evidence that it heard and was told to
ignore, even if it wants to do so, and base judgment only on the
admissible evidence. If jurors were explicit Bayesians, and calculated
likelihood ratios for each bit of evidence, then they could disregard
the evidence that they had heard but been told to ignore. They don’t
proceed in this fashion, but instead intuitively, and they cannot be
expected to determine the posterior odds on the basis of less than all
the evidence they heard, the essential point being that the posterior
odds are founded on belief rather than on acceptance.
When the ineffectuality of limiting instructions is pointed out,
judges tend to respond that the jury system presupposes that jurors
obey the instructions given them by the judge.85 By this the judges
84
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See L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance 117–125 (1992).
“Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.”
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954). A “crucial assumption
underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury [is] that jurors carefully
follow instructions.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n. 9 (1985). “A
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seem to mean that the jury system would have to be abandoned if
the presupposition were acknowledged to be incorrect. That is
untrue. The jury system presupposes some degree of compliance by
jurors with the rules laid down by the judge to guide them, but not
100 percent. Perfect compliance with rules is rarely attained in any
department of life, and is particularly unlikely in the case of an ad
hoc body that has only weak incentives to comply, since jurors are
neither penalized for bad performance nor rewarded for good. It is
not even clear that the jurors pay much attention to the instructions
on the law, as opposed to instructions to disregard particular
evidence, and yet as we saw earlier such lack of attention need not
fatally undermine the rationality of the jury system.
C. Relevance
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevance as “having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence” (Rule 401). The rules make relevant evidence admissible and irrelevant evidence inadmissible (Rule
402), but relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”
(Rule 403). These rules make economic sense. In Bayesian terms
(and well illustrating the heuristic value of Bayes’ theorem for
understanding the law of evidence), evidence is relevant if its
likelihood ratio is different from 1 and irrelevant if it is 1.86

central assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the instructions
they receive.” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 888 (10th Cir. 1998).
Not all judges fool themselves. Learned Hand, for example, called the limiting
instruction “the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else.” Nash v. United States, 54
F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). Occasionally courts concede the ineffectuality
of a limiting instruction. See, for example, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968) (reversing conviction where jury was permitted to consider a
codefendant’s confession that implicated the defendant).
86 See Richard Lempert, “Modeling Relevance,” 75 Michigan Law Review
1021 (1977).
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Irrelevant evidence so defined has zero social benefits, though it may
confer a private benefit by confusing or prejudicing the jury.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 401 point out that evidence can be relevant even though it bears on an undisputed fact,
because it may help to make the fact clear—and thus assist in establishing correct likelihood ratios. If a relevant fact is unclear,
though undisputed, the jury may not give it the proper weight in its
calculations. A related point, borrowed from signaling theory, is that
a certain amount of redundancy may increase rather than reduce the
intelligibility of a communication.87
Rule 403, in requiring an explicit comparison of benefit and
cost, is central to an economic analysis of the law of evidence in
much the same way that the Hand formula is central to the economic analysis of the law of torts. It sets forth a cost-benefit formula
for deciding the most common question in the law of evidence,
which is whether to admit or exclude evidence. It bears the same
relation to Equation (4) (–pxS = cx), the economic formula for the
optimal amount of evidence, as the Hand formula does to the
economic formula for the optimal amount of care (–pxL = cx).88
The cost-benefit formula implicit in Rule 403 can also be used to
evaluate particular rules of evidence,89 just as the Hand formula is
used in economic analysis of law as a standard for evaluating specific
rules of tort law. Rule 403 does, it is true, place a thumb on the scale
(“substantially outweighed”), but this may be necessary to prevent
the judge from taking over the factfinding task from the jury by excluding most of the evidence that favors the side the judge thinks
should lose.
87
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Schum, note 6 above, at 443.
I have relabeled D as L and A as c, in Landes and Posner, note 14 above, at
60 (eq. 3.9), to highlight the isomorphism of the formula for the optimal
amount of care with Equation (4). The cost-benefit interpretation of Rule 403 is
mentioned in Louis Kaplow, Note, “The Theoretical Foundation of the
Hearsay Rules,” 93 Harvard Law Review 1786, 1789 (1980). See also Thomas
Gibbons and Allan C. Hutchinson, “The Practice and Theory of Evidence
Law—A Note,” 2 International Review of Law and Economics 119 (1982).
89 This was essentially Bentham’s approach. He thought that there should be
no rules of evidence, but that in particular cases the judge should be allowed to
exclude particular items of evidence on grounds of “vexation, expense, and
delay.” Bentham, note 18 above, vol. 1, p. 1.
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Rule 403 is not as carefully drafted as it could be. It runs together three distinct grounds for excluding relevant evidence: (1)
emotionality (one source of “unfair prejudice” and of “misleading the
jury”), (2) cognitive overload (“confusion” (and other forms of
“misleading the jury”), and (3) “waste of time” (which seems
synonymous with “undue delay” and “needless presentation of
cumulative evidence”). At a first pass, the first two grounds relate to
the cognitive limitations of the trier of fact, and so go to the benefits
of the evidence in determining truth, while the third goes to cost,
the right-hand side of Equations (1) through (4). But this is not
precise. To begin with, two distinct types of cognitive limitation
should be distinguished. The first, often called “bounded rationality,”
arises from the fact that people do not have zero costs of absorbing
and analyzing information, and so encounter problems of overload.
This type of cognitive limitation is entirely consistent with
rationality, which does not presuppose zero costs of acquiring and
processing information. The second type of cognitive limitation,
however, is the domain of the cognitive illusions and emotional
distractions, the domain of irrational thinking. Ground (1) (what
I’ve called emotionality) corresponds to this second type of cognitive
limitation and ground (2) (cognitive overload) to the first. Keeping
evidence from the jury is an alternative to what might be timeconsuming and ineffectual efforts at enlarging and debiasing the
jury’s cognitive capacities.
Another way to think about this function of Rule 403 (and of
the rules of evidence generally) is as a corrective to the jury’s lack of
incentive to overcome its cognitive limitations by “thinking hard”
about the issues that it is asked to resolve. Jurors have no monetary
incentives to do a careful job; by screening from them evidentiary
materials that would make their job even more difficult and thus
require them to exert greater mental efforts without any
compensation, the rules of evidence reduce the jurors’ costs and so
increase their product.
Ground (2) also interacts with (3) (waste of time): repetition
and protraction can make it harder for the trier of fact to make a
correct judgment, as well as increasing the direct costs of the trial. As
more and more evidence is introduced, additional evidence even if
relevant is likely both to be wasteful in the sense of yielding
diminishing benefits in greater accuracy with no corresponding
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diminution in cost, and confusing in the sense of actually reducing
accuracy. This point suggests that the optimal length of a jury trial
may in most cases be quite short, because the benefits of additional
evidence are likely to decline at an accelerating rate while the costs
are constant—or even rising, as the litigants cast further and further
afield.
We can explore this point by modifying Equation (1) to allow
the amount of evidence (x) to have both a positive and a negative
effect on the probability of a true result, as in
(7) B(x) = p(b1x – b2x2)S – c(x)
where b1 measures the effect of a unit of x in increasing the accuracy
of the trial and b2 its effect in decreasing that accuracy by confusing
or overloading the jury. The latter effect is assumed in Equation (7)
to increase at an increasing rate with increases in the amount of
evidence (hence the squaring of x). Depending on the values of b1
and b2, adding evidence may, beyond some point, actually reduce the
accuracy of the trial and thus reduce efficiency even if the additional
evidence is costless. Alternatively, confusion and overload could be
thought of as indirect costs of evidence that increase with the
amount of evidence, in which event the last term in Equation (1)
(c(x)) might be approximated by cdx + cix2, where cd is the direct
costs of the evidence and ci the indirect costs.
Evidence that is cumulative must be distinguished, however,
from evidence necessary to complete a mosaic of proof. A costly bit
of “additional” evidence might be cost-justified because it linked up
with other evidence to establish the truth convincingly.
Notice how by excluding irrelevant, and also relevant but on
balance unhelpful, evidence, Rules 402 and 403 counteract the
incentive of the parties in some cases to overinvest in evidence from a
social standpoint. We should expect these rules to be invoked most
often in big-money cases, for it is in such cases that the risk of
overinvestment is greatest. This suggests a possible direction for
empirical research.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

60

D. Character Evidence
The subsequent rules in Article 4 of the Federal Rules of Evidence particularize the general standard of Rule 403 with reference
to recurrent issues. The first of these rules, Rule 404, excludes (with
various exceptions)90 evidence of a person’s character when used to
show that he probably acted “in character” on the occasion involved
in the litigation. The principal consequence is to exclude evidence
that a criminal defendant has a criminal record (unless, as we shall
see, he testifies). Such evidence is relevant, because a person who has
committed a crime in the past has by doing so indicated a belowaverage propensity to comply with the criminal laws. But it is only
weakly probative, especially since repeat offenders are punished more
heavily than first-time offenders in part precisely to offset any greater
propensity to commit crimes that their previous offenses or offenses
have revealed. If recidivists are punished heavily enough, the
propensity to commit a second or subsequent offense may be reduced
to the same level as the propensity to commit a first offense.
The principal concern with this class of evidence, however, is
not lack of probative value. It is the danger that a jury will give such
evidence too much weight, or more likely that it will convict on less
evidence believing that it doesn’t much matter if the defendant is
innocent of the particular crime for which he is being tried, since he
is a member of the criminal class and probably has committed other
crimes for which he has not been punished.
The Rule 404 exclusion is somewhat porous, though. For one
thing, evidence of prior crimes may be used to prove facts other than
propensity, such as motive, absence of mistake, or modus operandi
(see Rule 404(b)). If, for example, the defendant were being tried for
the murder of a witness who had been responsible for the defendant’s earlier conviction, that conviction would be admissible to prove
the defendant’s motive for committing the present crime. There is
also a blanket exception allowing the admission of prior-crimes evidence when the defendant is charged with rape or child sexual molestation and the prior crimes involved similar acts.91 The exception
may have an economic rationale—most clearly in the molestation
90

Most of the rules contain exceptions; this qualification should be borne i n
mind throughout, as I will not repeat it.
91 Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 415.
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case—that is closely related to the motive exception in Rule 404(b).
Most people do not have a taste for sexually molesting children. As
between two possible molesters, then, only one of whom has a history of such molestation, the history establishes a motive that enables
the two suspects to be distinguished; and prior-crimes evidence is
admissible to prove motive. Unlike a molester, a thief, unless he is a
kleptomaniac, does not have a taste for theft. Theft is merely instrumental to his desire for money, and there are many substitute
instruments. Hence the fact that a defendant accused of theft
committed a prior theft doesn’t show that he “likes” theft and so
does not furnish a motive for his committing the current theft with
which he’s charged.
It has been argued that a rational juror, aware of the inadmissibility of prior-crimes evidence, and so knowing that he won’t
find out whether the defendant is a habitual or first-time offender,
will assume that that there is some probability greater than zero but
less than 1 that the defendant is indeed a habitual offender, and so
will underestimate the guilt of the habitual offender and
overestimate that of the first-time offender.92 The assumption that
jurors behave in such a way is severely unrealistic, and Schrag and
Scotchmer present no evidence that it is, nevertheless, correct. Their
better point is that if prior-crimes evidence were freely admissible,
and jurors were highly prone to convict habitual offenders whether
or not the evidence showed guilt, deterrence would be undermined.
The expected cost of punishment of habitual offenders would fall
because that cost is a function not of the probability of punishment
per se, but also, as I noted earlier, of the difference between the
probability of punishment given guilt and the probability of
punishment given innocence. (A partial offset, however, is that
there would be an additional disincentive to becoming a habitual
offender.) The expected cost of punishment of first-time offenders
would fall also. Prosecutors would find it so much easier to convict
habitual offenders whether or not guilty that their incentives to
prosecute first-time offenders would be impaired, assuming that
prosecutors operate with a budget constraint and, as suggested
92

See Joel Schrag and Suzanne Scotchmer, “Crime and Prejudice: The Use of
Character Evidence in Criminal Trials,” 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 319 (1994).
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earlier, want to maximize convictions weighted by length of
sentence, subject to that constraint.
The most important exception to the exclusion of character
evidence, found in Rule 609, concerns the use of such evidence in
cross-examination. If a defendant has been convicted within the
previous ten years of a crime involving fraud or other deceit, the
prosecutor (or plaintiff—the rule applies to civil cases as well as
criminal ones and to all witnesses, not just the parties) has a right to
use that conviction on cross-examination to “impeach” (challenge
the credibility of) his testimony. Any other felony conviction within
the ten-year period can be used for this purpose as well if the judge
concludes that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The rationale of the rule is that a person who has flouted the
criminal law in the past is unlikely to take seriously his oath to testify
truthfully. This may be; but it is doubtful that he is more unlikely to
take his oath seriously than a first-time offender who thinks he can
lie his way to an acquittal.93 That is, there is no basis for supposing
recidivists more likely than first-time offenders to lie; both are
criminals, and the incentive of a criminal to lie seems unrelated to
whether he has committed one crime or more than one. What is
probably true, though only loosely related (through the heavier
punishment of recidivists) to whether the defendant is a recidivist, is
that a defendant is more likely to lie the heavier the punishment he
faces if he’s convicted. If so, then the relevant datum is the
punishment he faces, not whether he is a recidivist as such. On
balance, there is probably no benefit in enhanced accuracy to allowing prior-crimes evidence to be used in cross-examination. But
there is a cost—the same cost as the cost of allowing prior-crimes
evidence to be used to prove a criminal propensity. Despite the limiting instruction to which the defendant is entitled, the jury cannot
be expected to confine its consideration of prior-crimes evidence to
the issue of the defendant’s credibility. By reducing the probability
that a habitual offender who testifies will be acquitted, and so by
deterring habitual offenders from testifying—and with much the
same effect, since the jury is apt to infer guilt from the defendant’s
failing to testify (and this, once again, regardless of any limiting
93

If the defendant is innocent, presumably he will give truthful testimony.
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instructions)—the rule undermines the deterrence of habitual offenders.
E. Repairs and Settlement Offers
1. The Subsequent-Repairs Rule and the Issue of Cognitive Illusion
Rule 407 excludes evidence that the defendant took steps after the
accident or other incident that is the basis of the plaintiff’s suit to
prevent a recurrence. This evidence might be probative, because the
steps that the defendant took may show that the accident could have
been prevented at modest cost. I mentioned the rule earlier but recur
to it here in order to examine the argument that the trial of accident
cases is contaminated by the cognitive illusion known as “hindsight
bias.”94 Rule 407 may be designed not only to reduce the cost of
accidents by encouraging remedial measures but also to combat
hindsight bias—what in prospect may have been highly unlikely may
in retrospect appear to have been inevitable. Hindsight bias is a cognitive illusion of which we are all aware, as is indicated by the currency of such expressions as “the wisdom of hindsight.” What is
more, the concept of a “freak accident” is familiar, and it encapsulates
the idea that accidents can be very low probability events. One
might expect the defendant’s lawyer to be able to explain to a jury
that while of course the accident did happen, the probability that it
would have happened was slight.95 Furthermore, hindsight bias is
often rational, for example when the occurrence of an accident
shows that a hypothetical possibility was a real one; and thus it is
often not an illusion at all.96
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Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, note 35 above, at 1523–1525.
For experimental evidence that hindsight bias can be reduced or even
eliminated by emphasizing the role of chance in human affairs and hence the
probabilistic character of many events, see David Wasserman, Richard O .
Lempert, and Reid Hastie, “Hindsight and Causality,” 17 Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 30 (1991).
96 See Mark Kelman, “Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A
Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler,” 50 Stanford Law Review 1577,
1583–1584 (1998); Mark Kelman, David Elliot, and Hilary Folger,
“Decomposing Hindsight Bias” 3–4 (forthcoming in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty).
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There is experimental evidence that juries are subject to the
irrational form of hindsight bias.97 But the evidence is limited and
also weak—though not because it is based on experiments using
mock juries. Even though the behavior of mock juries cannot
automatically be extrapolated to real ones, an experiment designed to
test a difference (such as between an ex ante and an ex post
determination of care) need not be invalidated by the discrepancy
between experimental and real-world conditions.98 To reject the
studies of hindsight because the experimental subjects were not real
jurors one would need a reason to think that if mock jurors exhibit
hindsight bias, real ones do not; and it is by no means obvious what
that reason would be. The problems with the studies are
particularistic rather than fundamental. In neither the LaBine and
LaBine nor the Kamin and Rachlinski study were the juries instructed on burden of proof; in neither did they deliberate; and in
both they may have favored liability in the ex post situation not
because of hindsight bias but because of their substantive views on
liability (many jurors probably believe that people who cause
accidents should pay for them regardless of fault).99 There is
experimental evidence that deliberation increases the accuracy of jury
verdicts.100 And the fact that an instruction which warned the jury
about hindsight bias had no effect in the Kamin and Rachlinski
study (no such instruction was given in the LaBine and LaBine
study) supports the conjecture that what looks like hindsight bias is
97

See Susan J. LaBine and Gary LaBine, “Determinations of Negligence and
the Hindsight Bias,” 20 Law and Human Behavior 501 (1996); Kim A. Kamin
and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability i n
Hindsight,” 19 Law and Human Behavior 89 (1995). In contrast, in an experimental study using state court judges as the experimental subjects, Viscusi,
note 50 above, found much less hindsight bias than the previous studies had
found.
98 Saks, note 7 above, at 8.
99 See LaBine and LaBine, note 97 above, at 512; Kamin and Rachlinski, note
97 above, at 100–101; Kelman, note 96 above, at 1584. Hence Rule 411
excludes evidence that the defendant had liability insurance.
100 See, for example, Hastie, Schkade, and Payne, note 46 above, at 305–306;
Gail S. Goodman et al., “Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions,”
22 Law and Human Behavior 165, 200 (1998).
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really just a difference in substantive standards. Of course this point
cannot be of much comfort to jury supporters, since it implies that
the jury is disobeying the law; and such disobedience will generate
legally unsound outcomes as surely as cognitive illusions will.
I am left uncertain as to what weight concern with hindsight
bias should have in the design of rules of evidence for negligence
cases. The broader issue, to which I cannot do justice within the
compass of this article and which in any event is not primarily an
economic issue, is whether cognitive illusions seriously undermine
the accuracy of the factfinding process in trials and if so what ought
to be done, given that judges may be subject to them to the same or
almost the same extent as jurors. If, however, the direction of the
resulting bias is known, it can be offset by revising other features of
the legal process. Suppose, for example, that juries have a propensity
to acquit guilty defendants but judges do not have a propensity either
to acquit guilty defendants or to convict innocent ones. Then, as we
saw earlier, the innocent defendants will tend to waive their right to
a jury; and so we need to worry only or mainly about the guilty ones.
We can discourage them from exercising their right to trial by jury
by increasing the reward for “acceptance of responsibility,” which
under the federal sentencing guidelines is essentially a sentencing
discount for pleading guilty and thus waiving all trial rights. This
need not be done by reducing the sentences of those who plead
guilty and thus undermining deterrence. It can equally well be done
by increasing the sentences of those who do not plead guilty.
2. The Inadmissibility of Settlement Offers
The rationale for excluding settlement offers from evidence is
straightforward. Although such evidence would be relevant in
showing how the party who made the offer evaluated the strength
of his case and therefore how strong that case probably is, allowing
the evidence to be presented at trial if settlement negotiations break
down would increase the cost of settling cases and so reduce the
number of settlements.101 Plaintiffs would tend to make unrealistically high demands in order to signal (in the event of trial) the
101

See Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, “Keeping Society i n
the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence i n
Court,” 26 RAND Journal of Economics 203 (1995).
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strength of their case, and defendants would tend to make unrealistically low offers for the same reason. As a result, it would be
more difficult to negotiate to a mutually acceptable price. That
would be a bad thing unless the social costs of settlement exceed the
social cost of trials, which is unlikely in an era of heavy caseloads.
F. Hearsay
Hearsay or secondhand evidence is evidence of what someone
who is not a witness said, offered to establish the truth of what the
out-of-court declarant said. One might have thought that a rule
governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence would be a footnote
to Rule 403, but instead, because of its complexity, it gets its own
article of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Article VIII). More radically, one might wonder why there needs to be a hearsay rule at all.
The only reason to have rules excluding evidence that does not impose indirect costs (evidence such as that of subsequent repairs) is
that the inexperienced trier of fact, the jury, will give too much
weight to the evidence even if given a limiting instruction or other
guidance by the judge. But much of the “evidence” on which people
act in their personal lives and their careers is hearsay, so one might
expect them to be experienced in sifting and weighing hearsay
evidence.
Even so, the hearsay rule can probably be justified by the “waste
of time” factor in Rule 403, or more precisely the costs of the trial
process. Because the jury, unlike the judiciary in an inquisitorial
system, does not engage in an active search for evidence, it cannot
terminate the evidentiary process at the point at which the benefits
of a further search would exceed the costs. The hearsay rule helps to
do this for the jury by excluding an indefinite mass of generally
dubious evidence.102 The many exceptions to the rule allow into
evidence those forms of hearsay that have probative value equivalent
to that of first-hand evidence, a good example being a statement
against interest—a kind of statement that one is unlikely to make
unless it is true. The hearsay rule can also be understood as working
in tandem with Rules 402 and 403 to counteract the incentives
operative in some cases to overinvest in evidence.
102

For a contrary view, argued from a broadly economic perspective, see
Kaplow, note 88 above, at 1794–1804.
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G. Testamentary Privileges and Exclusionary Rules
Rule 501 deals with privilege but does not enumerate the privileges recognized in federal litigation. It provides merely that the
existence of privilege shall be governed by federal or, where appropriate, state common law, except as superseded by statutes or the
Constitution. I shall examine the more important privileges.
1. The Marital Privileges
The rationale of the marital privileges103 is similar to that of the
repair and settlement rules: collateral costs. A confession to one’s
spouse that one had committed a crime would be highly probative
evidence of guilt and no more confusing, prejudicial, time-wasting,
etc. than any other confession offered in evidence. It is excluded out
of fear of weakening the marriage by making spouses distrustful of
each other. Whether the fear is justified is doubtful. The privilege
might actually induce some people to marry who wouldn’t otherwise, and marriages induced by a desire for evidentiary advantage
are unlikely to be stable. More important, by lowering the cost of
crime for married people, the privilege encourages (though no doubt
only very slightly) such people to commit crimes; and the commission of a crime by a spouse is a highly destabilizing event for a marriage. A stronger argument could be made for the privilege if it were
limited to civil cases.
Even if the benefits of marital privilege are slight, the costs in
valuable evidence forgone may also be slight and so on balance there
may be little gain from abolition. For if the privilege were abolished,
and this were widely known, spouses would be much less likely to
make damaging admissions to each other; and so abolition would
not create a cornucopia of valuable evidence. This is in contrast to
the repair rule. Allowing evidence of subsequent repairs to be
introduced at a trial would reduce the incentive to make such repairs
but would not come close to eliminating it, because of the benefits
of the repairs in averting future liability. So abolishing the
103

There are two marital privileges. The testimonial privilege applies to all
communications, whether made before or during the marriage, the public
disclosure of which might undermine the marriage, but only the spouse asked
to testify can invoke this privilege. The marital-communications privilege,
which is the one I shall focus on, can be invoked by either spouse, but it is
limited to communications made during the marriage.
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subsequent-repairs rule would generate some evidence, though the
social cost of the evidence (in reduced safety) might exceed its social
benefit (in more accurate determinations of liability). The benefits of
admitting wrongful conduct to one’s spouse are smaller (and so abolishing marital privilege might cause such admissions to quite dry up),
though perhaps not wholly negligible since the admission may be
necessary in order to elicit valuable assistance from the spouse in
evading punishment.
2. The Lawyer-Client Privilege
The most important testamentary privilege is the lawyer-client
privilege. The lawyer cannot be forced to divulge statements made to
him by his client in the course of their professional relationship. I
want to focus on the application of the privilege to statements made
in the course or contemplation of litigation, rather than to
statements made in the course of seeking legal advice with respect to
contemplated acts.104 As in the case of a confession to one’s spouse,
a confession to one’s lawyer would be highly probative evidence of
guilt. The rationale for its exclusion is that the adversary process
would not work well if parties could not speak to their lawyers in
complete confidence. To evaluate this rationale, we must consider, as
with the subsequent-repairs rule and the marital privileges, what the
consequences of abrogating the lawyer-client privilege would be.
One consequence would be to make clients much more guarded
about what they told their lawyers. As a result, not much valuable
evidence would be obtained by making lawyers subject to being
called as witnesses against their clients. So once again the benefits of
abolishing the privilege, unless “chilling” lawyer-client conversations
were considered a public good, would be slight. Another
consequence of abolishing the lawyer-client privilege would be that
potential litigants would invest more in learning at least the
rudiments of law, so that they could speak to their lawyers with
minimum risk of making damaging admissions. Abrogating the
privilege might thus increase enrollment at law schools!
104

The different considerations applicable to the two types of statement are
emphasized in Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,” 102
Harvard Law Review 565 (1989).

69

Economics of Evidence

Third, lawyers, fearful of extracting damaging admissions from
their clients, might fail to elicit from them information that the
client was unaware would demonstrate that his case had merit.105
Fourth, and probably most important, abrogation would encumber
the trial process and confuse juries. The same person might be
appearing both as the advocate for a party and as a witness against
that party—that, or the party would have to change lawyers as soon
as he discovered that he had made a damaging admission to his
current lawyer. He might have to change lawyers more than once,
since he would be telling his story to each new lawyer in turn.
Notice that the case for an evidentiary privilege is greatly
weakened if the people entitled to invoke it either don’t know about
it or would not be affected by its abrogation.106 In the limiting case,
where abolition of a privilege would have no deterrent effect on the
creation of evidence, abolition would be all benefits and no costs.
Consider the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Apparently most
people are unaware that such a privilege exists107—and how many
people of the few who are aware of it, and who were minded to
consult a psychotherapist despite the continuing stigma that mental
illness carries in our society, would be deterred by fear that the psychotherapist might someday be called as a witness against him?108
3. The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure
The point I’ve been emphasizing that abrogating rules of
privilege might yield only a meager evidentiary harvest is applicable to
other exclusionary rules, notably the much-criticized rule excluding
evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure. Such evidence is
generally highly probative, and sometimes essential, and its exclusion
has seemed a disproportionate sanction for police misconduct. Yet
105

This point is emphasized in Ronald J. Allen et al., “A Positive Theory of
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine,” 19 Journal of
Legal Studies 359 (1990).
106 See American Bar Association, note 77 above, at 100–102.
107 Daniel W. Shuman and Myron S. Weiner, “The Privilege Study: A n
Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege,” 60 North
Carolina Law Review 893, 925 (1982).
108 Some; the dispute giving rise to litigation might cause psychological
distress that would make one consult a psychotherapist, provided it would not
hurt one’s litigation chances.
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most of the people who make this criticism do not argue that the
misconduct should be condoned, or redefined as proper conduct;
they merely advocate the substitution of other sanctions that would
not involve excluding the fruits of the illegal search. But if the
substitute sanctions were effective in deterring the misconduct, there
wouldn’t be any fruits, and so there would be no gain from the
standpoint of accuracy in adjudication. What the critics should be
advocating is either that the standard for determining whether a
search is illegal should be redefined, and specifically that searches
should be deemed illegal only if the evidentiary benefits do not equal
or exceed the costs of the search to the victim; or that the only
sanction for an illegal search should be a suit for compensatory
damages. The latter approach would require the police, in effect, to
“buy” the fruits of their “illegal” searches from the victims, which
they presumably would do when the evidentiary benefits exceeded
the costs to the victim of the search.
4. Compulsory Self-Incrimination
The most hallowed and yet at the same time one of the most
questionable of the evidentiary privileges is the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Concerns with the
use of torture to extract confessions are understandable and could be
given an economic rationale, but these concerns could be allayed by
prohibiting torture (including its attentuated forms, such as relay
questioning and the “third degree”) and making punishment for
contempt of court, whether by fine, imprisonment, or forfeiture of
the right to defend, the sole sanction for a refusal to testify. The
privilege denies the court highly probative evidence, and the benefits
of the privilege are exceedingly difficult to pin down. The best argument for it is the
strong policy in favor of government’s leaving people
alone…The government should not disturb the peace of an
individual by way of compulsory appearance and compulsory
disclosure which may lead to his conviction unless sufficient
evidence exists to establish probable cause. Obviously, if the
individual’s peace is to be preserved, the government must
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obtain its prima facie case from sources other than the
individual.109

But this concern (which parallels the argument discussed earlier for
placing the burden of producing evidence on plaintiffs rather than
defendants) could be taken care of by cutting off the privilege as
soon as the government has gathered enough evidence from
independent sources to indict, and by limiting the amount of time
that the government could demand of the suspect for answering
questions.110
One way to pose the issue of abolishing the privilege is to adopt,
in a manner congenial to economists, the ex ante perspective and ask
whether, if the privilege protects only (or mainly) the guilty, people
choosing behind the veil of ignorance, and so not knowing whether
they will be victims of crime or criminals (or innocent people
mistakenly prosecuted), would support or reject the privilege. Since
only a modest fraction of the community will become criminals or
even criminal suspects, and since the only cost to the criminal from
the abrogation of the privilege would be to make it more difficult for
him to avoid his just deserts, there might be an overwhelming vote
in favor of abrogation.
The preceding paragraph began to relax the implicit assumption
that the only people who make damaging admissions are guilty
people. An innocent person can be suspected of crime and he may
say things that can be used to weave the net of suspicion more
tightly around him; or he may simply have a suspicious cast of
countenance. The greater the danger that the abolition of the
privilege would lead to some erroneous convictions, the stronger the
case for the privilege. This point bears on an unraveling problem
that the right to waive privilege creates. Suppose that only guilty
people would make the kind of damaging admissions that the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (and also the lawyer109

John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, § 2251,
p. 317 (John T. McNaughton revision 1961). McNaughton’s entire discussion
of the arguments for the privilege is exemplary. See id., pp. 295–318.
110 I do not consider the quite distinct problems presented by the assertion of
the privilege in nonlitigation settings, such as hearings before congressional
committees.
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client and marital privileges) enables defendants to avoid or conceal.
Then the innocent would always waive privilege in order to signal
their innocence.111 Anyone who did not waive the privilege would
properly be considered guilty. This is the basis on which jurors often
infer guilt from the defendant’s refusal to take the stand, even
though they are told not to draw any inference of guilt from such a
refusal. If, however, the innocent too bear a cost of waiving
privilege, then the refusal to waive it cannot be reliably interpreted as
a sign of guilt. Judges who want jurors to take seriously the principle
that guilt should not be inferred from a refusal to waive the privilege
against being compelled to incriminate oneself will have to come up
with a credible explanation to give juries for why an innocent person
might fear the consequences of testifying. I am not sure there is a
credible explanation; the danger of an innocent person’s making
admissions that would make the jury think him guilty may be
theoretical rather than real.
The criminal defendant’s decision whether to testify, thus
waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, can be
modeled as follows:112
(8) p = p1x1 + (1 – t)p2 + tp3tx2
where p is the probability that the defendant will be found guilty, p1
the probability of guilt generated by the other evidence in the case
(x1), p2 the probability of guilt that the jury will infer if he doesn’t
take the stand, p3 the probability of guilt that the jury will infer if he
takes the stand and testifies (with x2 being the testimony that he
will give), and t being the decision whether to testify, with t taking a
value of 1 if he testifies and 0 if he does not. If he testifies, the
middle term on the right-hand side of Equation (8) is wiped out,
but if his testimony is damaging to him then the third term (which
becomes simply p3x2) will be positive, while if he declines to testify
the third term disappears but the second term is positive. The
decision to testify will depend, therefore, on a comparison of the
111

See generally Daniel R. Fischel, “Lawyers and Confidentiality,” 65
University of Chicago Law Review 1 (1998).
112 I am indebted to Anup Malani for this formulation.
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middle term in the decline case with the third term in the testify
case.
This approach can be used to model any case in which the
absence of evidence gives rise to an inference, as in versions discussed
earlier of the McDonnell Douglas scenario and the hypothetical bus
case, and in cases of statistical evidence with low significance levels.
In the bus case, for example, p would be the probability that the
owner of the bus that injured the plaintiff was Company A, the defendant; p2 would be the (negative) contribution to p if the only evidence is the percentage of buses owned by A and if this implies that
the plaintiff is withholding evidence that the bus in question was
actually owned by B (that is, if t = 0); and p3 would be the
contribution to p if the plaintiff puts in additional evidence (x2),
beyond the bare statistic, concerning ownership.
H. Expert Witnesses113
Articles VI and VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a
number of provisions relating to witnesses, especially (Article VII)
expert witnesses. The most important are Rule 602, which confines
nonexpert witnesses to testifying from first-hand knowledge, and
Rule 702, which permits an expert witness to testify about matters
within his area of expertise “in the form of an opinion.”114 An
opinion is an inference drawn from a combination of first-hand
knowledge and background knowledge. If one sees dark clouds and
offers an opinion that it is about to rain, the opinion represents the
conjunction of the observation of the clouds with background
knowledge about weather signs. The extensive background
knowledge that denotes a person as being expert in some field
enables him to offer opinions that would be irresponsibly speculative
in the mouth of a lay person.
Because of the technical complexity of many of the issues that
arise in modern lawsuits, heavy reliance on expert witnesses seems to
be the only alternative to moving to a system of specialized rather
than (largely) generalist courts, which would have its own
113

The discussion in this section draws on Richard A. Posner, “The Law and
Economics of the Economic Expert Witness” (forthcoming in Journal of
Economic Perspectives).
114 Rule 701 permits very limited opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
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problems.115 But there is considerable dissatisfaction with the use of
expert witnesses. This dissatisfaction has two main sources, which
are related. First, because the experts are paid by the respective parties,
it is feared that they are partisans of whoever hired them (“hired
guns”) rather than being disinterested, and hence presumptively
truthful, witnesses. This of course does not distinguish them sharply
from a number of other types of witness, notably the parties
themselves, who once were forbidden on this ground to testify at all.
But, second, it is feared that expert witnesses can mislead judges and
juries more readily than lay witnesses can because they are more
difficult to pick apart on cross-examination; they can hide behind an
impenetrable expertise expressed in an unintelligible jargon. Even if
they are demolished on cross-examination by a lawyer who has been
carefully prepped by his own expert, the jury may not understand the
questions and answers in the cross-examination well enough to
realize that the expert has been demolished. A subordinate concern,
closely related to the concern with intelligibility, is that opposing
experts often simply cancel each other out. The expected outcome is
unaffected, and so the use of the experts creates costs without any
benefits.
None of these concerns, however, seems especially grave,
provided—a vital qualification to which I’ll return—that the expert is
testifying in an area in which there is a consensus on essential substantive and methodological premises.
Regarding the first concern, four points need to be made:
(1) Because most expert witnesses, unlike most lay witnesses, are
repeat players, they have a financial interest in creating and
preserving a reputation for being honest and competent. Any public
judicial criticism of a witness (in an opinion, whether or not
formally published, or even in the transcript of a trial or other
hearing) is apt to impair the expert’s career as a witness, sometimes
fatally, because the criticism is likely to be brought up in subsequent
cross-examination of this expert.116 Many expert witnesses,
115

Discussed in Posner, note 25 above, ch. 8. But it is important to realize
that specialized courts are a possible solution to the perceived problems with
using expert witnesses.
116 “A favorable mention in a reported case is of real benefit to a forensic [that
is, a testifying] economist, while an unfavorable mention is a major cost.”
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moreover, are employed by consulting firms, which have a corporate
reputation that can be damaged by the errors of any of their
employees. And professors may incur heavy nonpecuniary costs in
diminished academic reputation (something they value a lot, or else
they probably would not be academics) if they are shown up as
careless or dishonest witnesses.
This discussion does not provide a complete answer to the
concern with partisanship, because it is also the repeat player who
has an incentive to please his client, so that he’ll be hired in the
future. Because expert witnesses may not be paid on a contingent
basis, the one-time expert witness has nothing to lose or gain from
giving dishonest or slanted testimony.
(2) The expert witness who has a record of academic publication
will be “kept honest” by the fact that should he try to repudiate his
academic work on the stand, he will be open to devastating crossexamination. This implies that a warning flag should go up
whenever an expert witness either has no record of academic
publication or is testifying about matters on which he has never
published. Not only is such an expert less likely to testify truthfully,
but the lawyer’s choice of him as an expert witness implies that the
lawyer was unable to find a genuinely knowledgeable person who
was willing to testify in support of the client’s position.
(3) Because of the adversary character of the American system of
litigation, and the requirement that the expert disclose his evidence
during the pretrial discovery process and thus before the trial begins,
expert evidence is subject to intense critical scrutiny.117 This should
deter at least some irresponsible expert testimony. In the case of
economics, where the tradition of replicating previous academic
studies is relatively weak,118 a study conducted for purposes of
Thomas R. Ireland, Walter D. Johnson, and Paul C. Taylor, “Economic
Science and Hedonic Damage Analysis in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow,”
10 Journal of Forensic Economics 139, 156 (1997). For an example of “unfavorable
mention,” see In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1996
WL 351178 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1996).
117 As an example of what awaits expert witnesses in cross-examination, see
Stan V. Smith, “Pseudo-Economists—The New Junk Scientists,” 47 Federation
of Insurance and Corporate Counsel Quarterly 95 (1996).
118 This may be why academic researchers have adopted the 5 percent
significance level rather than a 10 or 20 percent level. The less frequently
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litigation is likely to receive more intensive scrutiny that an academic
study, even one published in a refereed journal.
(4) An expert witness’s evidence is inadmissible if it does not
satisfy the methodological standards in the expert’s field.119 That is
something that is easier for the judge to determine than whether the
evidence is sound. This rule acts as a screen against “junk science.”
The mesh of the screen may actually be too fine for statistical evidence, as we saw earlier. Notice that the existence of the screen may
deter the preparation of subprofessional expert testimony, as the
expert will worry that his reputation may be impaired if his evidence
is excluded as “junk science.”
If market incentives kept experts fully honest, defendants’
lawyers would often not introduce expert testimony at all, because
they would find it difficult to locate a reputable expert who would
contradict the plaintiff’s expert.120 So we would expect both sides to
present expert witnesses more often the “softer” the science related to
the case.
The second concern with the use of expert witnesses—the
concern with intelligibility once the evidence has been admitted—has undoubted merit, but not as much as intuition might
suggest. For it ignores incentive effects. A witness who cannot make
himself understood by the court is unlikely to be persuasive. This is a
particularly important consideration in jury trials, because jurors
often give less weight to credentials than to clarity.121 If expert
testimony is clearer in jury than judge trials, juries may understand
expert testimony as well as judges even if the average judge is somewhat brighter than the average juror.
studies are replicated, the more important it is to subject them to the internal
discipline of a stiff significance test. See Lempert, note 86 above, at 1099.
119 See, for example, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993); Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th
Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 111 F.3d 528,
537 (7th Cir. 1997); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318–319 (7th
Cir. 1996); Faigman et al., note 69 above, at 2–45.
120 See Deanne M. Short and Edward L. Sattler, “The Market for Expert
Witnesses,” 22 Journal of Economics 87, 89 (1996).
121 See Daniel W. Shuman, Anthony Champagne, and Elizabeth Whitaker,
“Juror Assessments of the Believability of Expert Witnesses: A Literature
Review,” 36 Jurimetrics Journal 371, 379 (1996).
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This is not a complete answer to the criticism from unintelligibility. Many fields are so technical that it is unrealistic to expect
the average juror or judge to be able to understand all the criticisms of
a study conducted by an expert in the field. (That is why increased
technical complexity of evidence is not a powerful argument against
the use of juries.) A partial solution is suggested by a study which
found that jurors give great weight to credentials when the expert
testimony is very complex.122 This is rational. The more credentialed
expert has a larger potential reputation loss from giving evidence that
falls below acceptable professional standards.
Another way to deal with the problem of the unintelligibility of
complex expert testimony would be more frequent appointment of
court-appointed experts. The power to make such appointments is
explicitly conferred on federal judges by Rule 706 yet rarely
exercised.123 The usual objection to its exercise is that the judge can’t
know whether he is picking a genuine neutral to be the court’s
expert. This objection can be overcome by borrowing a leaf from a
common method of selecting arbitrators: each party chooses an
arbitrator and the two arbitrators choose a neutral, who generally
casts the deciding vote. The parties’ experts could, similarly, agree on
a neutral expert who would be appointed by the court and would
testify either along with or instead of the parties’ experts.124 His
neutrality would quite properly give his views decisive weight with
the jury. It would not matter whether the jurors understood him; his
conclusion would be credible because of his neutrality and expertise.
Things can be rationally believed though not understood. People
rationally believe that airline travel is safe without knowing what
keeps the plane in the air.
122

Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett, and Holly L. Sukel find in their article
“Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?” 20 Law and
Human Behavior 379, 391–392 (1996).
123 See Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts:
Defining the Role of Experts Appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 (1993);
Faigman et al., note 69 above, at 43–44.
124 This was proposed in Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Econometrics in the Courtroom,” 85 Columbia Law Review 1048, 1096 (1985). A variant of this
procedure has been employed in at least one case, Leesona Corp. v. Varta
Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also American
Bar Association, note 77 above, at 246.
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The third concern about expert testimony, that opposing experts often cancel each other out, would be taken care of if the
parties’ experts selected a neutral expert to be the only expert witness.
But is it a real concern? For it might seem that whenever the
opposing experts canceled each other out, the parties would agree
not to call them, in order to reduce the expense of litigation. This
happens occasionally, but not often, maybe because a lawyer who
suggested it would be understood to be signaling that he thought his
expert less credible than the opponent’s expert.
Where the use of expert witnesses is most problematic is in areas
in which there is insufficient common ground to keep the witness
honest. This used to be, and to some extent still is, the situation
with regard to antitrust economics. A perfectly respectable
economist might be an antitrust “hawk,” another equally respectable
economist a “dove.” Each might have a long list of reputable
academic publications fully consistent with systematically proplaintiff (or pro-defendant) testimony. A judge or jury would
therefore have little basis for choosing between them, especially since
each witness might be reasoning with impeccable logic from his
premises—premises equally plausible to a lay audience. And there
might be no neutrals having relevant expertise, in which event a
court-appointed expert would perforce be a partisan. I do not have a
solution to this problem.
Another situation in which the use of a court-appointed expert
is problematic is where (for example, in the damages phase of the
case) the expert witness’s bottom line is a number. For then, in the
case of opposing witnesses, the trier of fact can “split the difference,”
after weighting each witness’s estimate by its plausibility. (Without
such weighting, the defendant’s expert would testify to zero damages
and the plaintiff’s to infinite damages.) With this qualification, it
can be shown that an estimation derived in this manner may be
superior to that of a solitary expert witness.125
A major social cost of expert evidence is not discussed at all in
the literature on expert witnesses. That is the deflection of academic
125

Luke M. Froeb and Bruce H. Kobayashi, “Competition in the Production
of Costly Information: An Economic Analysis of Adversarial versus CourtAppointed Presentation of Expert Testimony” (George Mason University
School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper #93–005, Aug. 20, 1993).
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researchers, especially those with tenure, from scholarly work to
testifying. Although testifying, by giving academics access to data
that they would not otherwise have, may occasionally pay academic
dividends, it is unlikely that the net output of American universities
(weighting quantity by quality) is greater as a result of professors’
being in demand as expert witnesses. If academic salaries were equal
to the social marginal product of academics, the deflection of
academics from doing research to giving testimony would not reduce
social welfare. But if academic research produces social gains not
captured by the researcher, and if that surplus is less than the surplus
created by academics’ testifying, then the practice of hiring academics to testify does impose social costs. The second “if,” however,
is indeed iffy. Accurate adjudication creates social benefits (in particular, enhanced deterrence of wrongful conduct) not wholly
captured by the expert witnesses in the fees they charge. In addition,
the opportunity to make extra income may draw able people into
academia who would otherwise choose some other occupation; but
this is a weaker point. The opportunity of professors to moonlight
may enable universities to pay lower salaries to academics, and so may
not affect the supply of academics. And since testimonial
opportunities are randomly distributed across the academic spectrum
in relation to value of research output, the principal effect of moonlighting income, even if it is not offset by lower academic salaries,
may be to alter the distribution of academics across fields without regard to social product.
Supposing that expert testifying is here to stay, we should
consider how it might be improved. I have suggested greater use of
court-appointed experts selected by the method used to pick a neutral
arbitrator. I have also mentioned judicial criticism as a method of
bringing reputation costs to bear on the errant expert. Although
there is a danger that such criticism may be uninformed, if so the
damage to the expert’s reputation will be less. The next time he
testifies he will have an opportunity to try to rebut the criticism if it
is thrown up at him on cross-examination. And his lawyer may be
able to persuade the judge in the new case to prevent the use of the
earlier judge’s criticism on cross-examination, on the ground that its
probative value is slight in relation to its prejudicial effect.
Two further measures for improving the quality of expert evidence are worth considering. The first is for each professional
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association from whose membership expert witnesses are drawn to
maintain a roster of all testimonial appearances by members. The
roster would contain abstracts of each member’s testimony and any
criticisms of the testimony by the judge in the case or by the lawyers
or experts on the other side of the lawsuit. It would enable the
profession to monitor its members’ adherence to high standards of
probity and care in their testimonial forays. Procedures could be
established to enable members to challenge inaccuracies, and, having
thus been validated, the roster could be made available to the courts.
I am not appealing to altruism in making this suggestion. Each
association, which is to say the members (or rather the majority of
them) of the association, would benefit from the maintenance of
the roster. The effect of the roster in deterring the hiring as expert
witnesses of disreputable members of the profession represented by
the association would increase the association’s prestige. It would
also increase the consulting incomes of its reputable members by
reducing the competition of the disreputable members of the
profession. The incentive to maintain such a roster would thus be
the same as that of any other form of professional self-policing: to
reduce the external costs that the misbehavior of one member of a
profession imposes on other members.
Second, lawyers who call an expert as a witness could be required to disclose the name of all the experts whom they had
contacted as possible witnesses before settling on this one. This
would alert the jury to the problem of “witness shopping.” Suppose
that the lawyer for the plaintiff hired the first economist,
agronomist, physicist, physician, etc. whom he interviewed and the
lawyer for the defendant hired the twentieth whom he interviewed.
A reasonable inference from this pattern is that the defendant’s case
is weaker than the plaintiff’s. The parallel is to conducting twenty
statistical tests of a hypothesis and reporting (as significant at the 5
percent level) the only one that supported the hypothesis being
tested.
Conclusion
The length of this article and the number of distinct issues
discussed in it argue for a recapitulation of some of the more important and interesting points. They are these:
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1. The process by which evidence is obtained, presented, and
evaluated in a trial can be fruitfully modeled in economic terms,
using either a search model or a cost-minimization model and
incorporating Bayes’ theorem as a guide to rational decision making
under uncertainty.126 Economic analysis captures the major
concerns about evidence law (including “noneconomic” concerns),
of which the most important from an economic standpoint are
accuracy (because accuracy usually though not always promotes
deterrence) and cost. Economic analysis of evidence reveals, among
other things, that the amount of evidence generated in an
unregulated adversary system may be more or less than the social
optimum. Economic analysis also and relatedly provides a guide to
optimal regulation of evidence. It can thus be used as a criterion for
evaluating the law of evidence. The article, like much positive
economic analysis of core doctrines and institutions of the legal
system, finds a considerable although far from complete congruence
between that law and the dictates of efficiency.
2. Although the inquisitorial system (which is predominant
outside of the Anglo-American legal sphere) is superficially more
efficient than the adversarial because in principle it facilitates the
optimum amount of evidence gathering, as the adversarial system
does not, economic analysis furnishes no convincing basis for
choosing between the systems. Among frequently overlooked
considerations bearing on this conclusion are that the rules of
evidence enable the judge in the adversarial system to ameliorate the
problem of socially excessive evidence search, while at the same time
the rules governing burden of production enable him to ameliorate
the problem of socially insufficient search; that rational (but socially
inefficient) bias is apt to be a more serious problem with judges in an
inquisitorial system than with juries in an adversarial system; and
that the competitive and highly visible character of the adversarial
system operates to correct incentive problems created by an
inquisitorial system.
3. The greater public visibility of the adversarial system, especially in jury trials, creates an exaggerated impression of the failures
126

In Part IIB, I attempted to counter some of the criticisms that have been
made of applying Bayes’ theorem, or mathematical probability more generally,
to trials.
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of the system relative to those of inquisitorial systems. The latter,
operating with less public visibility, are better able to bury their
mistakes. Similarly, the more that plea bargaining is disfavored, as is
common in inquisitorial systems, the more accurate the criminal
justice system will appear to be, because more one-sided cases will be
tried in such a system than in one in which plea bargaining
(settlement) is encouraged and so most one-sided cases are pleaded
out before trial.
4. Economic comparison of the inquisitorial and the adversarial
system leads to specific predictions, such as that the former will be
less concerned with judicial bias, burden of production, and burden
of persuasion.
5. A principal social value of the right of cross-examination is
deterrent: the threat of cross-examination deters some witnesses
from testifying at all and others from giving false or misleading
evidence. Merely observing cross-examination, therefore, does not
give a complete picture of its social value.
6. Burdens of persuasion and production (including the
seemingly “artificial” burdens of production in discrimination cases)
are economizing devices. The heavier burden on the plaintiff
(prosecutor) in criminal than in civil cases reflects not only the
greater cost of a mistaken conviction than a mistaken acquittal, as
stressed in the earlier economic literature, but also game-theoretic
factors arising from the inequality of resources between prosecution
and defense in almost all cases.
7. Contrary to widespread belief, rational allocation of prosecutorial resources reduces the probability of convicting the innocent
to minute levels when crime rates are high, while, also for economic
reasons, the error rate in civil cases is far lower than the
preponderance (“more likely than not”) standard of proof implies.
a. The first of these points implies that in times of rising
crime rates, it is socially efficient to reduce the procedural rights of
criminal defendants (as the Supreme Court has done) unless
prosecutorial resources are expanding as rapidly as crime rates are
rising, which they have not been.
b. The second point implies that if a class of cases can be
identified in which, after a thorough search for evidence, the
probability that the plaintiff’s claim is meritorious barely exceeds 50
percent, the legal system should refuse to litigate these cases. The
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social benefits of the very slight gain in accuracy obtained by
litigating them are unlikely to be as large as the social costs of
conducting trials in these cases. This may be the answer to the
question whether a plaintiff who presents merely “naked” statistical
evidence of the defendant’s liability should be allowed to get to a
jury.
8. It is a mistake, however, to use the 5 percent significance level
that is conventional in statistical research as a criterion of the
admissibility of a statistical study in a trial. Significance levels are
relevant to the weight to be given a study. But their academic use as
criteria of publishability is a function of considerations that do not
figure in litigation, such as the need to ration space in scholarly
journals.
9. If juries are competent to resolve factual disputes, they should
also be competent to resolve disputes over the application of law to
fact, notably a dispute over whether the defendant was negligent.
Judge Learned Hand’s negligence formula shows that such a dispute
is in fact one purely of fact.
10. The formal rules of evidence (for example as codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence) cover only a portion of evidence law.
Many so-called substantive rules, such as the parol evidence rule of
contract law, are in actuality field-specific evidence rules. Most rules
of evidence, however classified in law, exhibit economizing
properties, though there is much room for reform.
11. When the doctrine of harmless error is modeled in economic terms, it can be shown that the doctrine creates an incentive
for prosecutors to commit deliberate errors, and so should perhaps be
modified.
12. Limiting instructions are ineffectual unless the judge is able
to persuade the jury that the excluded evidence is not probative. In
other cases, no such instruction should be given unless requested by a
party, and if given it should not be regarded as curative of any error
in the admission of evidence.
13. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an explicit
cost-benefit formula for determining the admissibility of evidence. It
is central to the economic theory of evidence in much the same way
that the Hand formula is central to the economic theory of torts.
The benefits relevant to Rule 403 are benefits in greater accuracy.
The costs are both reductions in accuracy (for example, because the
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evidence sought to be excluded under the rule is confusing) and costs
of administering the legal system. The hearsay rule and a number of
the other specific rules of evidence can be subsumed under Rule 403.
14. Evidence of prior crimes should generally be excluded from
trials whether it is offered to demonstrate a propensity to commit
crimes or, on cross-examination, is offered to demonstrate a
propensity to lie under oath. There is no reason to suppose that
previously convicted defendants are greater liars than current
defendants who are guilty in fact (if they are not guilty, they are less
likely to lie and, as a practical matter, it doesn’t matter whether they
do). And since recidivists are punished more heavily than first
offenders, it is not even clear that previously convicted defendants
have a greater net propensity to commit crimes than persons who
have not been convicted previously.127 In the case of certain sex
crimes, however, as recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence recognize, a history of prior crimes may demonstrate the
defendant’s inelastic demand for this type of conduct.
15. The rules forbidding the introduction in evidence of subsequent repairs by a tort defendant and of settlement offers by either
party are justified by the external costs of such evidence in reducing
safety and reducing the settlement rate, respectively. The
subsequent-repairs rule may also be justified by concerns with
hindsight bias, but these concerns seem exaggerated and in any event
could be dealt with by other measures.
16. The importance of external costs in the law of evidence is
further illustrated by the many rules of privilege (such as the marital
privileges, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and
the lawyer-client privilege) and of exclusion (for example, of illegally
obtained evidence). Many of the conventional justifications for the
privileges and exclusions are weak, but a strong one is that
abrogating them would not produce a rich harvest of evidence but
would simply cause people to clam up when talking to spouse,

127

If they do, however, then there is an argument for allowing prior-crimes
evidence, but it is offset by the effect of allowing such evidence on the
incentives of prosecutors; they will overinvest in prosecuting prior, as distinct
from first-time, offenders because the former may be easier to convict regardless
of guilt if such evidence is allowed.
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lawyer, priest, and so on.128 And substituting other but equally
effective sanctions for illegal searches and seizures would (by
definition of “equally effective”) reduce the amount of illegally seized
evidence by as much as the exclusionary rule reduces it. The principal
exception to these points is the self-incrimination rule. But there is a
distinct economic objection to forcing people to give evidence
potentially incriminating them. It is much the same as the economic
reason for placing the burden of production on the plaintiff rather
than the defendant in ordinary civil litigation. By forcing prosecutor
or plaintiff to bear a significant cost of litigation, we reduce the
frivolous or harassing use of the courts. But this is an argument for
requiring probable cause to require a potential defendant to testify
rather than for the current absolute privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.
17. The growing complexity of evidence, as a result of scientific
and technological progress, has placed new strains on a system that
relies on lay people (and judges are lay people in this domain) to
determine facts. But many of the criticisms of the use of expert
witnesses are superficial. To know and to understand are different
things. Jurors may be able to place warranted confidence in the
testimony of an expert witness, on the basis of signals of competence
and incentive (there are market incentives for experts to testify
honestly), without being able to make an informed evaluation of the
expert’s testimony. The use of expert testimony can, however, be
improved by various measures—including the maintenance by
professional associations of a roster of the forensic activities of their
members.
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When, however, abolition would not deter the creation of evidence because
the people entitled to invoke the privilege were unaware of it, the case for
abolition is strong.

